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ABSTRACT
I addressed three questions in Labor Economics, using experimental and quasi-experimental variation to
determine causality. In the first chapter, I ask whether playing longer in the NFL increases mortality in
retirement. I compared players with very short careers with those with long careers. I also examined
mortality for replacement players used briefly during the 1987 players' strike. I find that mortality is 15
percent higher for players with longer careers. This difference is even larger for positions with a high risk
of injury.
In the second chapter, we use a randomized experiment to evaluate the effects of academic
achievement awards for first- and second-year college students studying at a Canadian commuter
college. The award scheme offered linear cash incentives for course grades above 70. Awards were paid
every term. Program participants also had access to peer advising by upperclassmen. Program
engagement appears to have been high but overall treatment effects were small. The intervention
increased the number of courses graded above 70 and points earned above 70 for second-year students,
but generated no significant effect on overall GPA. Results are somewhat stronger for a subsample that
correctly reproduced the program rules.
In the third chapter, we examine two questions: (1) What is the value of receiving the first draft pick in
the National Basketball Association?, and (2) Do teams lose intentionally to secure higher draft
positions? We answer the first question by adjusting for the probability of winning the lottery using a
propensity score methodology. The estimates indicate that winning the draft lottery increases
attendance by 6 percentage points during the five-year period following the draft. Receiving the first
pick is also associated with a small increase in win percentage. To answer the second question, we use a
fixed-effects methodology that compares games in which a team can potentially change its lottery odds
to games at the end of the season in which these odds are fixed. Since 1968, playoff-eliminated teams
have seen around a 5 percentage point increase in win percentage once their lottery odds are fixed. This
difference has ballooned above 10 percentage points in more recent years.
Thesis Supervisor: Joshua Angrist
Title: Ford Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Long-Term Mortality Effects of an NFL Career
Professional football is a high-profile dangerous industry. Around 30 percent of National Football League
(NFL) players see at least one season end early due to tendon or ligament damage, broken bones,
concussions, or other injuries. However, for many young men, the perceived benefits of an NFL career -
fame, high salaries, medical and training services, and utility from playing football - outweigh the
perceived injury risk. Using mortality data on all NFL players born between 1936 and 1976, I attempt to
quantify the overall effects of time spent in the NFL on mortality. Baron et al. (2012) report that NFL
retirees have lower mortality than the age-matched general public, but NFL players are positively
selected on many genetic characteristics, smoking rates, and physical fitness history. To reduce positive
selection bias, I compare NFL retirees with short careers to retirees with long careers. Cox proportional
hazard and OLS models yield no significant linear relationship between career length and mortality.
Career-shortening injury histories may increase mortality, however, biasing these estimates downwards.
To address this bias, I examine the early retirement margin, before most players can accumulate
substantial injury histories. I estimate that mortality for players with careers longer than three years is
about 15 percent higher than mortality for players with three year careers, assuming a constant
proportional effect across all ages. For positions with a high risk of injury, the mortality hazard for players
with more than three years' experience is 25 percent higher. As an additional check, I compare 1,000
"replacement players" from the three-game 1987 players' strike to the NFL population. Though many
replacement players are not yet 50 years old, traditional NFL players appear to have 50 to 100 percent
higher mortality rates.
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I. Introduction
Professional football is a high profile example of a dangerous industry. Each year, more than 200
players are forced onto the National Football League's (NFL) injured reserve list, ending their season
prematurely. Around 30 percent of players land on the injured reserve list at least once in their career,
due to concussions, ligament or tendon damage, broken bones, or other injuries.' However, for many
young men, the perceived benefits of an NFL career - fame, high salaries, medical and training services,
and utility from playing football, among other factors - outweigh the perceived injury risk. In this paper,
I attempt to quantify the overall effect of time spent in the NFL on mortality.
Several survey-based studies suggest that NFL retirees have a poor quality of life. Forty percent
of NFL retirees self-report arthritis pain compared with 11 percent of the similarly aged general
population (Golightly et al., 2009). Concussions sustained while playing football are correlated with self-
reported dementia and memory loss (Guskiewicz et al., 2005) and depression diagnoses (Guskiewicz et
al., 2007), which are symptoms of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). Known as "punch-drunk
syndrome" in boxers, CTE causes brain degeneration, leading to memory loss, depression, impaired
motor function, and, eventually, death. Numerous clinical studies (see, for example, Stern et al., 2011)
have diagnosed CTE in deceased athletes with a history of concussion. While these studies have
generated substantial interest in the health effects of contact sports, they do not prove that playing in
the NFL reduces quality of life or life expectancy. First, NFL players differ from the general population in
many ways. Second, establishing a causal link between head injuries and CTE is difficult, since diagnosis
must be done post-mortem and few brains have been made available for study. Third, concussion risk is
just one aspect of playing in the NFL that may affect mortality.
Direct mortality analysis for NFL players is limited. The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) has published two reports (Baron et al., 1994, Baron et al., 2012) showing that NFL
players live longer than the age-matched general population. However, in line with evidence relating
CTE to concussions, the NIOSH observed higher death rates from brain degenerative diseases (CTE is
often diagnosed as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, or ALS) for NFL players compared to the general population
(Lehman et al., 2012).
These comparative studies likely suffer from omitted variables bias as well; NFL players have
lower smoking rates, higher BMIs, better athletic ability and other genetic characteristics, and a stronger
NFL team rosters are capped at 53 players. Placing a player on injured reserve ends his season in nearly all cases
and opens up a roster spot for another player. I generated injured reserve statistics using weekly injury report
tracking (available from 1994 to present) from the STATS database used throughout this study (described in the
following section).
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fitness history compared with the general population. This bias is an example of the "healthy worker
effect": in most settings, employees have better health outcomes than the general population because a
minimum health standard is required to maintain employment (see, for example, McMichael, Spirtas,
and Kupper, 1974, McMichael, 1976, Carpenter, 1987). The NFL also provides health insurance to many
retirees and disability payments to those who qualify. These benefits reduce the costs and increase the
incentives, respectively, for NFL retirees to obtain various health diagnoses. Because of these issues, the
mortality effects of an NFL career remain unknown.
I employ a different approach to measure mortality effects. Using data on game participation
and mortality for all players born between October 1, 1936, and October 1, 1976, I compare mortality
for players with shorter versus longer careers. Estimating the relationship between career length and
mortality reduces the contribution of some omitted variables, but may introduce other biases. First,
there may be an inframarginal healthy worker effect: players may have shorter careers because they
lack physical ability or have a poor work ethic. These characteristics likely increase mortality for players
with short careers, biasing estimated effects of career length on mortality downwards. Second, acute
injuries shorten careers (Edgeworth Economics, 2010). These injuries may also increase mortality,
biasing estimated effects downwards again. Third, players may leave the NFL because they have a strong
outside option. The value of a player's best outside option is probably negatively correlated with his
mortality, biasing the estimates upwards.
Cox proportional hazard models yield no significant linear relationship between career length
and mortality. The precision in these estimates is sufficient to rule out a 5 percent difference in
mortality for each additional year played for most subgroups studied. OLS estimates are similar,
suggesting a slight decrease in mortality before age 40 for players with longer careers and no mortality
differences at older ages. These results contrast with estimates for Major League Baseball players
showing that the correlation between career length and mortality in a less risky environment is strongly
negative (Abel and Kruger, 2006, Saint Onge, Rogers, and Krueger, 2008). Under the assumption that
omitted variables biases are similar in professional baseball and football, the difference between sports
suggests that the true mortality impact of a longer NFL career is positive, especially given additional
potential downward bias from career-shortening injuries in the NFL.
To reduce the possible bias due to injuries and make a stronger case for a positive mortality
effect, I investigate the early retirement margin, before most players can accumulate substantial injury
histories. Specifically, I compare mortality for players who played less than three years against mortality
for those who played more than three years. Using Cox hazard models with constant proportional
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effects at different ages, I find that players with careers longer than three years have about 15 percent
higher mortality than players with shorter careers, stratifying on birth cohort and playing position and
controlling for NFL draft selection number, college football program quality, height, and BMI. While
these estimates may still be biased by differences in ability, effort, and outside options, estimates for
positions with a high risk of injury buttress the results. For these positions, mortality for longer-tenured
players is 25 percent higher. This increased hazard ratio suggests that a greater physical toll explains the
higher mortality for players with careers longer than three years, rather than variation in outside
options (for example).
Players with careers under three years are still exposed to substantial injury risk and may
participate in professional football for longer than three years in some cases (on practice squads or in
other short-lived leagues). To get closer to the full effects of an NFL career, I compare mortality rates
between NFL players and around 1,000 "replacement players," who played up to three games during
the 1987 NFL players' strike. These players were not quite good enough to play in the NFL in normal
times and thus serve as a plausible control group with very low exposure to professional football. I find
that NFL player mortality, especially for those with long careers, is 50 to 100 percent higher than
replacement player mortality, although the small sample limits precision and mortality for replacement
players is only around 2 percent (many are not yet 50 years old). Still, along with the results at the three
year margin, these estimates improve on simple comparisons between the NFL and the general
population and suggest that time spent in the NFL does increase mortality for at least some players.
The next section describes the NFL and my data, followed by a detailed presentation of results
and concluding remarks.
II. Data
The NFL grew out of several smaller semi-professional and professional football outfits in the
1920s. League membership fluctuated through the 1940s before settling to 12 consistent teams in the
1950s. From 1947 through 1960, NFL teams played 12 regular season games and a varying number of
preseason games. The rival American Football League (AFL) launched in 1960 with eight teams and a 14
game schedule, and the NFL itself added two teams from 1960 to 1961 while moving to a 14 game
schedule. The AFL became competitive with the NFL fairly quickly, and the two leagues announced a
merger in 1966 (consummated in 1970), keeping the NFL name. All AFL statistics from 1960 to 1969 are
generally compiled together with NFL statistics, and I will refer to the AFL and NFL jointly throughout the
paper as simply the NFL. The ten team expansion from 1960-1961 is by far the NFL's largest permanent
7
expansion. The NFL has added a total of ten more teams since then and increased the number of regular
season games to 16 in 1978, reducing the number of preseason games to compensate. It also went
through brief player strikes in 1982 (seven games canceled) and 1987 (one game canceled and
replacement players used for three games).
My sample includes every NFL player born between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976. Unless
otherwise stated, all data originated from STATS, LLC, which maintains game statistics and other
information for various professional sports. Table 1 reports that players average about 5.1 years from
their first year to their last year in the league, generally entering between ages 22 and 24. This number
is slightly lower for smaller, faster players (non-lineman) at 4.9 years and higher for bigger players
(lineman) at 5.5 years. Many players do not play every game per season, due to injuries or coaching
decisions. Players average 57.6 games over a career, which is equivalent to 3.6 sixteen game seasons or
2
about 11 games per year.
NFL players are large. Average BMI in my sample is 29.3, while the average for the U.S. adult
male population increased from about 25 in 1960 to 28 in 2000 (Ogden et al., 2004). A BMI over 30 is
classified as obese, and, as shown in Figure 1, average BMI for more recent players is well over 30. It is
important to note, however, that BMI does not account for body fat percentage or muscle mass. During
their careers, NFL players are probably healthier than the average BMI-matched U.S. male or even the
average U.S. male. Still, I will control for BMI in all regressions, since it is an important risk factor for
many causes of death and no more sophisticated health measures are available.4
I gain an additional control variable from the NFL's annual amateur draft. About 67 percent of
my sample was drafted into the NFL (the others signed contracts in the open market after the draft).
During the draft, teams take turns selecting one college football player at a time. Teams have exclusive
rights for one year to negotiate contracts with all of their selected players, and new players are not
allowed to sign a contract with any team before the draft. Therefore, teams generally choose the best
prospects first, which makes each player's selection number in the draft order a proxy for (perceived)
ability. To account for undrafted players, I assign them the highest selection number plus one and
include a dummy variable equal to one for undrafted players in all regressions. To account for years
where the AFL held a separate draft, I take the draft number for the league in which the player started
2 I calculate years in the league as (last year played - first year played + 1).
3 Throughout the paper, I calculate BMI as (weight in pounds / height in inches2) x 703. Though I do not know
exactly when player height and weight are measured, these values are generally measured early in players'
careers.
4 Various studies investigate obesity as a risk factor for heart-related health problems among NFL players (see, for
example, Chang et al., 2009).
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his career (many players were selected in both drafts) and include a dummy variable equal to one for
players who chose to play in the AFL.s Figure 2 shows that players drafted sooner have longer careers.
This relationship confirms that draft number is a rough proxy for ability.
Using death dates provided by STATS, LLC, mortality for my sample and subgroups is between 5
and 10 percent (last row, Table 1). However, not all deaths appear in the STATS database. Matching a 10
percent sample of the data to the Social Security Death Master File (SSDMF) suggests that an additional
1 percent of the NFL retiree population has died.6 Unsurprisingly, the missing deaths in the STATS
database concentrate among players with careers shorter than three years. To correct this problem, I
run simulations that add additional deaths in line with the tenure-specific SSDMF match percentage and
repeat the main analysis of the paper. I describe this simulation procedure in more detail in the
following section. I am in the process of matching the complete dataset to the SSDMF and to a listing of
football retiree deaths from state and national administrative records maintained at
www.oldestlivingprofootball.com.
Deceased players had slightly longer careers, as shown in Table 2 (5.3 years played compared to
5.1 for the whole sample), and were slightly more likely to be drafted. The last row shows that about 5
percent of the sample died while still playing football or retired due to a terminal illness or non-football
injury. I exclude these players from all regressions, since they would introduce direct reverse causality
from mortality to career length.
In line with Baron et al. (1994) and Baron et al. (2012), I find that NFL players live longer than the
general population. Figure 3 displays Kaplan-Meier survival curves by age for NFL players and survival
curves for the general population based on 2007 cross-sectional mortality and longitudinal mortality for
the 1950 birth cohort from the Social Security Administration. The NFL mortality pattern is broadly
s Alternatively, I could include comprehensive dummies for status in each draft, but for Cox hazard estimation,
adding this set of dummies to my preferred specifications leads to failed convergence in many cases. Draft status
controls have little effect on OLS point estimates of interest regardless of the specification chosen.
6 For uncommon last names, I initially matched players to the SSDMF using birth month and last name and then
looked within the matched set for close matches on birthday, first/middle name, initials, and state of social
security number issuance (birth state in my data). If a player matched exactly on the first two conditions, I counted
the player as deceased. If a player matched exactly on birthday and first/middle name were missing but initials
matched, I counted the player as deceased only if the state of social security number issuance matched the birth
state. Before finalizing any matches, I performed Google searches to ensure that players were not definitively still
alive. For common last names, I initially matched by birth month, last name, and first initial, and then followed a
similar procedure.
7 There are few such individuals, so it is unlikely that their exclusion biases the results substantially. Also, slightly
more than half of these players had careers longer than three years, and so including them in regressions with a
dummy variable for careers longer than three years would only increase the estimated mortality effects of longer
careers.
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similar to that of the U.S. male population, but NFL mortality is lower at every age. NFL players with
BMIs above 30 show survival rates closer to the U.S. male population up to age 60 and higher survival
rates thereafter. Since BMI in this range is positively correlated with mortality at most ages and average
U.S. adult male BMI has risen from 25 to 28 over the period, it is likely that NFL players outlive their BMI-
matched general population counterparts by a substantial margin. However, these comparisons do not
answer whether playing football decreases mortality, since NFL players are a highly selected group.
For easier reference, Table 3 presents raw NFL mortality rates at different ages. Each row (and
all future age-specific mortality calculations) excludes cohorts that have not reached the stated age
threshold, since more players may die in these cohorts before the threshold passes. About 1-2 percent
of each subgroup has died by age 40. Mortality is slightly higher for bigger players and increases to 7-12
percent before age 60 and 18-24 percent before age 70.
Since the long-term effects of head trauma have received substantial attention recently, I
collected data on cause of death for players with at least a three years' experience by conducting Google
searches for death reports and obituaries, using individuals' full name, nickname(s), college attended,
NFL teams played for, position played, place of birth and death, and other personal characteristics when
available. Tables 4 and 5 list cause of death distributions at each age for all players with at least three
years' experience and for the subset with BMI over 30, respectively. For comparison, the tables list
cause of death breakdowns for the general population from 1999 to 2009, according to the Center for
Disease Control.8 Car accidents make up a relatively high share of NFL player deaths, especially before
age 40 (20 percent). Heart attacks are also overrepresented among deaths before 40. Despite significant
concern over recent high profile NFL suicides, NFL suicide rates are lower than general population rates,
declining from 7 percent of NFL deaths before age 40 to 3 percent of deaths before age 70. However,
deaths directly attributed to brain degenerative diseases (ALS, Parkinson's, CTE, Dementia, and
Alzheimer's) make up 2 to 3 percent of NFL deaths at all ages, while these causes barely register in the
general population. Unfortunately, I could not obtain cause of death for about 25 percent of deaths
before ages 60, 65, and 70. Many of these missing causes are reported as "natural causes" and likely
explain some heart and cancer death discrepancies compared to the general population at older ages.
Missing data issues aside, these differences may not reflect causal effects of playing in the NFL due to
possible selection biases and differences in accuracy of diagnosis.9
8 obtained these data from the WONDER system, accessible at http://wonder.cdc.gov/mcd.html.
9 Since this is at best a descriptive exercise, I exclude players with one and two year careers. Initial searching
uncovered very limited information on cause of death for these lesser known cohorts.
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The next section presents OLS and Cox proportional hazard regression estimates exploring the
relationship between NFL career length and mortality/cause of death. To help facilitate interpretation of
these results, I will present effects separately for positions with relatively high and low injury
propensities. If a positive estimated relationship between career length and mortality is causal, then it
should be larger for positions at higher risk of injury. Table 6 reports position-specific injury rates from
2004 to 2009 from the NFL Injury Surveillance System (summarized in Edgeworth Economics, 2010).
These data include all injuries noted on teams' weekly injury reports as well as some injuries prior to the
season. Fast moving, frequently tackled offensive players (running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends)
are injured most often, accruing about 1.5 reported injuries per player per season. These players also
have the highest concussion rates (about 0.1 per season), along with fast-moving defensive players
(defensive backs) and quarterbacks. 0 Larger, slow-moving players (offensive line, defensive line, and
linebackers) suffer only 0.04 to 0.08 head injuries per season, though defensive linemen have a high
overall injury rate (about 1.5 per season).
Ill. Results
A. Linear Career Length Specifications
I first estimate a linear relationship between career length and mortality. While these estimates
may be biased by career-shortening injuries that also increase mortality, they provide a good starting
point for comparison. Table 7 presents Cox proportional mortality hazard regressions according to the
following constant-proportion specification:
h(t I Xi, Ci, si) = ho(t I si) exp(Xi8 1/+Ci 2),
where si is the stratum for individual i (defined, for example, by birth cohort), ho is the baseline hazard
function for stratum s,, X, is a vector of personal characteristics (for example, BMI, height, draft status),
C; is a measure of career length, h(t I X,, C, s,) is the hazard function for a given X;, C, and s,, and hence
exp(8 2), averaged across all strata, is the hazard ratio of interest." The first and third rows ("Years
10 Serious injuries may include some head injuries. Also, head injuries are generally under-diagnosed (Guskiewicz et
al., 2007). They may be reported more reliably for quarterbacks since hits to the quarterback's head are highly
visible. The study does not report injury rates for kickers. Kickers generally do not engage in the contact portion of
the game; anecdotal evidence suggests that they have a very low injury rate and an even lower severe/head injury
rate compared to other positions.
1I stratify by birth cohort and position played rather than control for these covariates for two reasons: (1)
stratifying improves optimization and precision, since the Cox proportional hazard model does not actually
estimate the hazard function for each stratum (the hazard function can take any form in the Cox model), and (2) I
am not especially interested in the estimated hazard ratios for these variables. Controlling for polynomials in birth
cohort instead of stratifying yields similar career length hazard ratios. I also collected racial percentages by
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Played") set C; equal to (last year played) - (first year played) + 1 for player i. The second and third rows
("Season Equivalents") set C equal to (games played)/16. Panel A controls for demographics only
(height, BMI, and birth cohort), while Panel B adds in controls related to the NFL (draft status and
position). The column headings define the sample for analysis, and the table lists hazard ratios with 95
percent confidence intervals in square brackets.
There is little change in the mortality hazard for a one unit increase in career length, measured
by years played or season equivalents. Hazard ratios for all specifications and samples are between 100
percent and 102 percent of baseline. The 95 percent confidence intervals for the full sample rule out any
effect smaller than a 4 percent shift in mortality. The standard deviation for years played is about 4.1;
therefore, these estimates are precise enough to rule out a 16 percent mortality change for a one
standard deviation shift in career length.
OLS regressions estimating mortality differences at various ages give similar results. Table 8
presents these estimates using the following OLS specification:
D(A)i = a + Xiy 1 + Ci 2 + Ei
where D(A); is a dummy equal to one if player i died before age A, and X, and C; are defined as above.
The sample excludes individuals who could not have reached age A by October 1, 2012, and all
coefficients in this and later OLS tables are reported in percentage point units. Estimates for mortality
differences by career length at ages 50, 60, 65, and 70 are not statistically significant and give a similar
level of precision to the hazard models.12 However, players with longer careers have measurably lower
mortality at age 40. For every additional year played, the probability of death before age 40 is about
0.07 percentage points lower (significant at the 1 percent level). This difference is primarily driven by
low injury risk positions, where age 40 mortality is about 0.10 percentage points lower for each
additional year.13 Although this point estimate is 7 percent of age 40 mortality, in absolute terms it is
small. A longer NFL career may help high-BMI players stay fit and help all players avoid early accidental
deaths, but only 1.4 percent of players die before age 40. More importantly, all of the results in table 8
common last names from the Census Bureau, which matched to about 75 percent of the sample. After estimating
the fraction of black players in the NFL in each year, I calculated the probability that each player is black, given
their last name. Controlling for this probability in the regression reduces sample size since the match was
incomplete and does not meaningfully change most point estimates.
For example, whole-sample mortality at age 50 is about 3.4 percent. The estimated standard errors for age 50
mortality differences by years played rule out any change less than 0.11 percentage points. The standard deviation
of years played is about 4.1 years, so I can rule out a mortality difference of about 0.45 percentage points for a one
standard deviation change. This difference is around 13 percent of observed age 50 mortality.
Significant OLS estimates at just one age suggest that mortality differences by career length may violate the
constant proportions assumption made for Cox hazard estimation. However, interactions between age and career
length are not statistically significant when added to the Cox models.
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could be driven by the biases discussed earlier. Some players with short careers may have retired due to
severe injuries that increased their mortality risk at all ages, and some players who died before age 40
may have had fitness or substance abuse problems that caused both their retirement and early death.
To learn more, I examine mortality differences between players with at three years' experience and
players with less experience.
B. Three-Year Threshold Specifications
Players who retire after three years or less may retire due to injury, but they have not had much
time to accumulate a long, mortality-increasing injury history. The results for this specification are quite
different: players with careers longer than three years have higher mortality than players with shorter
careers. Tables 9 and 10 repeat the Cox hazard and OLS analyses in Tables 7 and 8, respectively,
replacing linear measures of career length with dummies for playing more than three years. Table 9
shows that, after controlling for personal characteristics, draft status, and position, players who last
longer than three years have mortality rates over 25 percent higher than players with shorter careers
(significant at the 1 percent level). Within positions with a high risk of injury, mortality is 37 percent
higher for those with careers over three years. Although sample size shrinks at older ages, Kaplan-Meier
survival curves presented in Figures 4 and 5 suggest that the mortality hazard ratios for the whole
sample and for high-injury positions are similar across all ages. The mortality point estimates in Table 10
are somewhat consistent with these findings, though the effect appears to be concentrated at age 60
mortality.
These results suggest that NFL injuries increase mortality. However, missing deaths in the STATS
database may be biasing the results. To test this claim, I matched a 10 percent sample of players with no
recorded death date in the STATS data with the SSDMF (I describe the match procedure in the previous
section). Among players in this sample who played for three years or less, about 1.4 percent appeared in
the SSDMF. For players who played more than three years, the match rate was about 0.6 percent. I
added in deaths to match these rates in 500 separate simulations, using the distribution of observed
deaths in the STATS database to select age of death for the simulated data. After running the Cox hazard
models on each of the 500 simulated versions, I averaged the point estimates and 95 percent confidence
intervals to arrive at the numbers presented in table 11. Though smaller, these numbers suggest that
players with more than three years' experience have 16 percent higher mortality rates (significant at the
10 percent level). As before, this difference grows to 27 percent for high injury positions. Without more
accurate death data on hand, I take these to be my preferred estimates.
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While this analysis may reduce bias due to career shortening injuries, it ignores extant selection
biases. Draft selection number helps proxy for ability: the average selection number for players with
three years of experience or less is about 174, while the average selection number for players with more
than three years' experience is 116 (lower numbers imply earlier selection and therefore higher ability).
However, remaining ability and effort deficiencies for shorter career players not captured by the draft
could push mortality estimates lower. More worrying given the positive point estimate, these players
may also have better outside options that induce early retirement. This omitted variable could explain
the mortality increase for players with careers longer than three years. While these factors prevent
clean interpretation of the results, the larger point estimates for positions with high injury risk suggest
that injuries from time spent in the NFL cause at least some increase in mortality.
C. Replacement Players
The estimates above compare the results of a longer versus a shorter NFL career. Since players
with one, two, or three year careers still face substantial injury risk, this comparison may not reflect the
total effect of an NFL career, long or short. To get closer to the total effect, I could compare NFL players
to college football players who did not play in the NFL. In the absence of comprehensive data on college
player mortality, replacement players used for three games during the 1987 NFL players' strike are a
similar control group. These players were primarily former college football players who were not good
enough or chose not to play in the NFL, and their exposure to the NFL was very low. I identify
replacement players as any player whose career started in 1987 and played three games or fewer,
yielding 937 individuals. Some traditional players also satisfy these criteria (between 10 and 30 do so
most years), and some replacement players earned contracts to stay in the NFL after the three game
strike, but the vast majority of the 937 are replacement players. 14
Table 12 presents estimates from Cox hazard models comparing replacement players with
various subsets of the traditional NFL player population.1 s The column headings define the traditional
player sample included in the hazard model. Precision is low due to the small number of replacement
players, but the estimates generally suggest that traditional players have higher mortality rates than
replacement players. Compared to the full sample in column 1, the difference is large (around 40
percent higher mortality for traditional players) but not statistically significant. However, traditional
4 Unfortunately, the STATS data do not include specific game participation data for each player prior to 1991, so I
cannot identify replacement players with 100 percent accuracy.
1s Among the 10 percent random sample of players with no death date in the STATS data referenced earlier, no
replacement players appeared in the SSDMF.
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players with careers longer than three years (column 2) have 60 to 70 percent higher mortality than
replacement players (significant at the 10 percent level with demographic controls only). The differences
grow larger and increase in statistical significance when I restrict the sample to players born between
1958 and 1969, an 11 year window surrounding the most common birth year for 1987 NFL entrants.
Although these results are quite imprecise, on the whole they suggest that NFL players,
especially those with longer careers, have 50 to 100 percent higher mortality than replacement players.
Replacement players are mostly between 48 and 55 years old on 10/1/2012 with mortality around 2
percent, meaning that this large relative difference corresponds to a small absolute difference. Still, the
results are consistent with the findings above suggesting that an NFL career increases mortality,
especially for players with careers longer than three years.
D. Cause of Death and Concussions
Recent research suggests that repeated concussions may increase the probability of death due
to advanced CTE, though these studies are not yet conclusive due to small samples and limited use of
control populations (see, for example, Stern et al., 2011). If time in the NFL actually increases mortality,
head injuries are one possible channel for the effect. CTE causes erratic behavior, irritability, depression,
memory loss, and, eventually, a reduction in muscle control that mimics other diseases such as
Parkinson's, ALS, and Alzheimer's, leading to misdiagnosis (McKee et al., 2009). As with other
degenerative brain diseases, CTE itself may cause death, but CTE also increases risk factors for many
other causes of death. To test for this channel, I analyze whether death rates for causes tied closest to
CTE are higher for players with more than three years' experience than for players with exactly three
years' experience.
Specifically, I examine whether death due to degenerative brain diseases or suicide is more
common for individuals with careers longer than three years. Though CTE linkages for other causes are
weaker, I also address whether death due to alcohol and drug abuse is more common for these
individuals. Finally, I repeat the analysis by position-specific concussion risk. Tables 13 through 15
present the relationship between career length and specific causes of death, controlling for personal
characteristics, position, draft status, and number of NFL participants from each player's college. These
tables list coefficients in percentage point terms from separate OLS regressions for each cause of death,
1 Cause of death information available online becomes more and more limited for players with careers shorter
than three years.
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setting the dependent variable equal to one for the cause of interest and equal to zero for survivors and
for all other causes of death.1 7
For the whole sample, mortality at age 40 due to degenerative brain diseases or suicide is about
0.09 percentage points higher for players with careers longer than three years versus three-year players
(significant at the 5 percent level). While this difference seems small, overall mortality at age 40 due to
these causes is only about 0.14 percent. Similarly, the difference at age 50 is about 0.16 percentage
points, against an overall mortality rate of 0.25. Mentally-related mortality rates are not significantly
different between groups at age 60 or 65, and though statistically significant at age 70, the difference is
implausibly large. Differences for mortality rates including drug and alcohol abuse are a similarly large
percentage of the overall mortality rate at ages 40 and 50.
Although these results are consistent with the claim that longer careers lead to more
concussions, which lead to brain degeneration, there are three caveats that prevent this interpretation.
First, cause of death is more likely to be missing for players with shorter careers, inflating estimates for
all other causes of death. This is particularly evident at older ages in Table 13. Large, offsetting
coefficients for the missing category balanced against the cardiovascular, cancer, transport-accident,
and mentally-related mortality categories probably reflect data limitations for players with short careers
rather than any real difference. Second, most mentally-related deaths under age 50 in the sample are
due to suicide, which may be driven by depression or other life factors unrelated to concussions. Third,
Tables 14 and 15 show that differences in mentally-related mortality rates are counterintuitively biggest
for positions with the lowest risk of concussion. Given these challenges, I can draw no conclusion
concerning what injuries generate the mortality increase observed for NFL players with careers longer
than three years.
IV. Conclusions
Popular opinion holds that playing in the NFL increases mortality risk greatly, lowering life
expectancy into the 50s (see, for example, Will, 2012). This view is greatly exaggerated; a recent NIOSH
study (Baron et al., 2012) shows that NFL players actually live longer than the general population.
However, NFL players are a highly selected group of athletically talented individuals, and a trove of
survey and clinical work suggests that quality of life for NFL retirees is poor due to high rates of arthritis
and depression and dementia (possibly linked to concussions). In this context, I analyze whether time
I 1 present OLS results only for this section, since the Cox hazard models are highly erratic and often fail to
converge with full controls included for these low-mean dependent variables.
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spent in the NFL increases mortality in retirement for players born between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976.
This approach eliminates many omitted variables that plague earlier studies comparing NFL players to
the general population. However, barriers to causal inference remain. Career-shortening injuries,
ability/heredity, perseverance, and differing outside options may all bias estimates of the effect of
career length on mortality, primarily downwards.
Naive analysis employing a linear measure of career length shows that longer careers are
associated with slightly lower age 40 mortality, while career length is unrelated to mortality above age
40. This result suggests that the true effect could be positive. For comparison, Major League Baseball
career length is strongly negatively correlated with mortality at all ages, likely due to income effects and
the same negative biases relevant in football (Abel and Kruger, 2006, Saint Onge, Rogers, and Krueger,
2008). While the NFL's selection process and financial rewards may differ from Major League Baseball's,
baseball has far fewer career-shortening and mortality-increasing injuries. These injuries may bias my
NFL estimates downwards, yet I still estimate a less negative relationship in the NFL than the
relationship reported for Major League Baseball.
To reduce injury bias and narrow in on the causal mortality effect of playing in the NFL, I
compare players with more than three years of NFL experience to players with three years' experience
or less, who may have shorter injury histories that have less effect on mortality in retirement. Players
who persisted for longer than three years have 15 percent higher mortality, across all ages. This increase
is driven in large part by 25 percent higher mortality within positions with a high risk of injury. Using
replacement players from the 1987 NFL players' strike as the control group inflates the mortality
difference to 50 to 100 percent, though replacement players are only around 50 years old today with
mortality around 2 percent, and these estimates are not precise.
Although variation in players' outside options may explain some of these differences, these
estimates provides the most direct evidence to date that time spent in the NFL increases mortality in
retirement. These results reflect past playing conditions and player populations, which may lose
relevance as the NFL evolves and salaries increase. Still, they are a step towards understanding the risks
associated with contact sports, and, in fact, the mortality differences presented here increase for
younger cohorts. In future analysis, I plan to investigate these changes over time. Also, I hope to test
whether an instrumental variables approach with playoff participation instrumenting for total games
played yields similar results, since playoff qualification and success depends on the efforts of the entire
team.
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Years played
Games played
Season equivalents*
Career starting year
BMI
Drafted
Dead
Table 1. NFL Player Characteristics
All Non-Lineman
5.1 4.9
(4.1) (3.9)
57.6 54.1
(57.3) (53.5)
3.6
(3.6)
1982
(11.1)
29.3
(3.6)
0.67
(0.47)
0.07
(0.25)
3.4
(3.3)
1982
(11.0)
27.7
(2.4)
0.67
(0.47)
0.06
(0.23)
N 122954 3,724 4,778
*Games played divided by 16
Note: Sample includes players born between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976. Standard deviations
are in parentheses.
Table 2. Deceased NFL Player Characteristics
All Non-Lineman Lineman BMI > 30
Years played 5.3 4.9 6.1 6.1
Games played 61.6 54.2 72.6 73.0
Season equivalents* 3.8 3.4 4.5 4.6
Career starting year 1972 1971 1973 1974
BMI 29.5 27.6 32.4 32.5
Drafted 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.50
Death ended career 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05
N 808 477 311 348
*Games played divided by 16
Note: Sample includes players born between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976.
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Lineman
5.5
(4.2)
62.9
(60.8)
3.9
(3.8)
1982
(11.4)
33.2
(3.0)
0.70
(0.46)
0.08
(0.28)
BMI > 30
5.5
(4.2)
63.7
(60.6)
4.0
(3.8)
1985
(10.8)
33.0
(2.6)
0.69
(0.46)
0.07
(0.26)
Percent Mortality by Age
All
1.4
10,889
3.4
7,093
7.9
3,707
12.5
2,449
19.6
1,155
Non-Lineman
1.3
7,244
3.2
4,704
7.1
2,439
12.1
1,606
18.8
751
Lineman
1.8
3,262
4.0
2,132
10.0
1,151
13.1
776
21.2
378
BMI>30
1.8
3,992
4.5
2,190
11.3
1,034
15.5
699
23.8
341
Note: Samples include players born between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976 who could have
reached the specified age by 10/1/2012.
Table 4. Cause of Death Distributions by Age of Death
Age < 40 Age < 50 Age < 60 Age < 65 Age < 70
NFL Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop
Cardiovascular
Cancer
Degenerative*
Other Internal
Transport Accident
Drugs/Alcohol
Suicide
Other External
Missing
Total
N
0.25
0.14
0.02
0.01
0.20
0.05
0.07
0.19
0.08
1.00
106
0.14
0.09
0.00
0.22
0.13
0.14
0.12
0.15
0.28
0.16
0.02
0.03
0.12
0.04
0.05
0.12
0.16
1.00 1.01
226
0.25
0.17
0.00
0.25
0.11
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.29
0.16
0.02
0.04
0.09
0.03
0.04
0.09
0.26
1.00 1.02
380
0.32
0.29
0.00
0.24
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.03
1.00
0.29
0.18
0.02
0.04
0.08
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.26
1.02
447
0.32
0.31
0.00
0.23
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.28
0.18
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.27
1.00 1.02
517
*ALS, Parkinson's, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, Dementia, Alzheimer's
Note: The NFL population includes players with at least three years' experience born between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976. "Total"
may be greater than one due to cases with multiple causes of death. General population death rates (from the Center for Disease
Control) reflect all deaths over age 30 and under the indicated age.
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Dead by 40
N
Dead by 50
N
Dead by 60
N
Dead by 65
N
Dead by 70
N
0.33
0.33
0.01
0.23
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
1.00
106
Table 3.
Table 5. Cause of Death Distributions by Age of Death (BMI > 30)
Age<40 Age<50 Age<60 Age
NFL Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop NFL
Cardiovascular
Cancer
Degenerative*
Other Internal
Transport Accident
Drugs/Alcohol
Suicide
Other External
0.34 0.14 0.39 0.25
0.12 0.09 0.14 0.17
0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
0.00 0.22 0.02 0.25
0.22 0.13 0.13 0.11
0.03 0.14 0.03 0.07
0.07 0.12 0.06 0.07
0.12 0.15 0.10 0.07
0.35
0.15
0.02
0.03
0.11
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.32
0.29
0.00
0.24
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.03
Missing 0.05 0.12 0.23
Total 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.00
N 58 119 188
*ALS, Parkinson's, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, Dementia, Alzheimer's
Note: The NFL population includes players with at least three years' experience born
0.35
0.15
0.01
0.03
0.11
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.23
1.01
203
65 Age<70
Gen Pop NFL Gen Pop
0.32 0.33
0.31 0.17
0.00 0.03
0.23 0.05
0.04 0.09
0.02 0.02
0.03 0.03
0.03 0.06
0.23
1.00 1.01
237
0.33
0.33
0.01
0.23
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
1.00
between 10/1/1936 and 10/1/1976. "Total"
may be greater than one due to cases with multiple causes of death. General population death rates (from the Center for Disease
Control) reflect all deaths over age 30 and under the indicated age.
Table 6. Injuries per Player per Season by Position (2004-2009)
Position Any Severe Head
Quarterback 0.86 0.20 0.11
Offensive Line 1.16 0.28 0.04
Linebacker 1.25 0.26 0.08
Defensive Back 1.37 0.29 0.10
Running Back 1.45 0.29 0.11
Wide Receiver 1.47 0.26 0.10
Defensive Line 1.47 0.29 0.04
Tight End 1.52 0.30 0.11
Note: Statistics from the NFL Injury Surveillance System as reported in
Edgeworth Economics (2010).
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Table 7. Career Length and Cox Mortality Hazard Ratios
All
Years Played
Season Equivalents
Years Played
Season Equivalents
N
1.01
[0.99 - 1.03]
1.01
[0.99 - 1.03]
1.01
[0.99 - 1.03]
1.01
[0.99 - 1.03]
12,197
High Injury Low Injury
Position Position
Panel A. Demographic Controls
1.02 1.01
[0.99 - 1.04] [0.98 - 1.03]
1.02 1.00
[0.99 - 1.05] [0.97 - 1.03]
Panel B. Full Controls
1.02 1.01
[0.99 - 1.05] [0.98 - 1.03]
1.03 1.00
[0.99 - 1.06] [0.97 - 1.03]
5,388 6,379
High Concussion
Position
1.00
[0.97 - 1.03]
0.99
[0.96 - 1.03]
1.00
[0.97 - 1.03]
0.99
[0.96 - 1.03]
6,355
Low Concussion
Position
1.02
[1.00 - 1.04]
1.02
[0.99 - 1.05]
1.02
[0.99 - 1.05]
1.02
[0.99 - 1.05]
5,412
Note: The table reports mortality hazard ratios for Cox proportional hazard models with constant effects by
age, stratified by birth cohort in panel A and stratified by birth cohort and position in panel B. The row labels
denote the career length measure used and the column headings denote the group analyzed in each
regression. Demographic controls (panel A) include BMI, BMI squared, height, and height squared. Panel B
adds draft status controls, as described in the Data section of the paper, and the number of NFL participants
from each player's college. High injury positions are tight ends, defensive lineman, wide receivers, and
running backs; high concussion positions are quarterbacks, defensive backs, running backs, wide receivers,
and tight ends. Low injury and low concussion positions are the respective complements, including kickers. I
derive 95 percent confidence intervals (in square brackets) from robust standard errors.
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Table 8. Career Length and Percent Mortality (OLS)
All
Years Played
Dead by 40 -0.072***
(0.023)
N 10,852
Dead by 50 -0.073
(0.054)
N 7,070
Dead by 60 0.076
(0.114)
N 3,694
Dead by 65 -0.200
(0.168)
N 2,438
Dead by 70 -0.046
(0.287)
N 1,148
Note: OLS regressions include
Season
Equivalents
-0.079***
(0.026)
10,852
-0.076
(0.062)
7,070
0.115
(0.134)
3,694
-0.255
(0.200)
2,438
-0.107
(0.335)
1,148
position fix
High Injury Position
Season
Years Played Equivalents
-0.025 -0.032
(0.035) (0.038)
4,787 4,787
-0.088 -0.083
(0.089) (0.099)
3,084 3,084
0.215 0.265
(0.211) (0.243)
1,628 1,628
-0.361 -0.372
(0.292) (0.341)
1,071 1,071
-0.007 0.011
(0.519) (0.612)
493 493
e I effects, a third
Low Injury Position
Season
Years Played Equivalents
-0.103*** -0.111***
(0.034) (0.038)
5,682 5,682
-0.072 -0.081
(0.076) (0.089)
3,729 3,729
-0.004 0.042
(0.139) (0.169)
1,949 1,949
-0.127 -0.220
(0.207) (0.251)
1,300 1,300
-0.024 -0.147
(0.356) (0.413)
629 629
degree polynomial in date of birth, baseline
BMI, BMI squared, height, height squared, draft status controls as described in the Data section of the
paper, and the number of NFL participants from each player's college. High injury positions are tight
ends, defensive lineman, wide receivers, and running backs; high concussion positions are quarterbacks,
defensive backs, running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends. Low injury and low concussion positions
are the respective complements, including kickers. Coefficients are measured in percentage points.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 9. Career Length and Cox Mortality Hazard Ratios
High Injury Low Injury High Concussion Low Concussion
All Position Position Position Position
Panel A. Demographic Controls
Years Played > 3 1.24*** 1.34** 1.17 1.20 1.28**
[1.07 - 1.45] [1.07 - 1.67] [0.94 - 1.46] [0.96 - 1.51] [1.03 - 1.59]
Panel B. Full Controls
Years Played > 3 1.26*** 1.37*** 1.18 1.24* 1.29**
[1.07 - 1.48] [1.09 - 1.72] [0.94 - 1.50] [0.98 - 1.57] [1.02 - 1.62]
N 12,197 5,388 6,379 6,355 5,412
Note: The table reports mortality hazard ratios for Cox proportional hazard models with constant effects
by age, stratified by birth cohort in panel A and stratified by birth cohort and position in panel B. The row
labels denote the career length measure used and the column headings denote the group analyzed in each
regression. Demographic controls (panel A) include BMI, BMI squared, height, and height squared. Panel B
adds draft status controls, as described in the Data section of the paper, and the number of NFL
participants from each player's college. High injury positions are tight ends, defensive lineman, wide
receivers, and running backs; high concussion positions are quarterbacks, defensive backs, running backs,
wide receivers, and tight ends. Low injury and low concussion positions are the respective complements,
including kickers. I derive 95 percent confidence intervals (in square brackets) from robust standard errors.
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Dead
N
Dead
N
Dead
N
Dead
N
Dead
N
Table 10. More than Three
All
by 40 -0.079
(0.215)
10,852
by 50 0.174
(0.438)
7,070
by 60 2.112**
(0.915)
3,694
by 65 -1.097
(1.404)
2,438
by 70 0.179
(2.362)
1,148
Note: OLS regressions include position fixed effects, a third degree polynomial in date
of birth, baseline BMI, BMI squared, height, height squared, draft status controls as
described in the Data section of the paper, and the number of NFL participants from
each player's college. High injury positions are tight ends, defensive lineman, wide
receivers, and running backs; high concussion positions are quarterbacks, defensive
backs, running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends. Low injury and low concussion
positions are the respective complements, including kickers. Coefficients are measured
in percentage points. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Years Played and Percent Mortality (OLS)
High Injury Position Low Injury Position
0.376 -0.418
(0.324) (0.304)
4,787 5,682
0.276 0.061
(0.677) (0.597)
3,084 3,729
2.488 1.517
(1.542) (1.119)
1,628 1,949
-2.061 -0.315
(2.303) (1.726)
1,071 1,300
0.717 -0.550
(3.918) (3.016)
493 629
Table 11. Average Cox Mortality Hazard Ratios with Simulated Missing Deaths
All High Injury Position Low Injury Position
Panel A. Demographic Controls
Years Played > 3 1.15* 1.24** 1.09
[1.00 - 1.33] [1.00 - 1.53] [0.88 - 1.34]
Panel B. Full Controls
Years Played > 3 1.16* 1.27** 1.09
[1.00 - 1.36] [1.01 - 1.58] [0.87 - 1.37]
N 12,197 5,388 6,379
Note: The table reports mean mortality hazard ratios for Cox proportional hazard
models with constant effects by age, run on 500 simulations of data with added deaths
to match the estimated missing rate as described in the paper. I stratify by birth cohort
in panel A and by birth cohort and position in panel B. The row labels denote the career
length measure used and the column headings denote the group analyzed in each
regression. Demographic controls (panel A) include BMI, BMI squared, height, and height
squared. Panel B adds draft status controls, as described in the Data section of the
paper, and the number of NFL participants from each player's college. High injury
positions are tight ends, defensive lineman, wide receivers, and running backs; high
concussion positions are quarterbacks, defensive backs, running backs, wide receivers,
and tight ends. Low injury and low concussion positions are the respective
complements, including kickers. I derive 95 percent confidence intervals (in square
brackets) from averaged robust standard errors across all 500 simulations.
Table 12. Cox Mortality Hazard Ratios, 1987 Replacement Players versus Traditional Players
Years Played > 3, Years Played > 3,
All Years Played > 3 Born 1958-69 Born 1958-69 Entered 1987 Entered 1987
PanelA. Demographic Controls
Traditional 1.45 1.69* 1.55 1.73* 1.04 1.97
Player [0.85 - 2.47] [0.98 - 2.91] [0.89 - 2.70] [0.97 - 3.07] [0.42 - 2.59] [0.76 - 5.10]
Panel B. Full Controls
Traditional 1.38 1.60 1.67* 2.12** 1.85 5.27***
Player [0.80 - 2.39] [0.91 - 2.83] [0.92 - 3.03] [1.10 - 4.06] [0.64 - 5.36] [1.66 - 16.66]
N 12,197 7,582 4,308 3,016 1,318 1,148
Note: The table reports mortality hazard ratios for Cox proportional hazard models with constant effects by age, stratified by birth
cohort in panel A and stratified by birth cohort and position in panel B. The row labels note that ratios compare traditional players
to 1987 replacement players (see text for definition) and the column headings denote the subset of traditional players analyzed in
each regression. Demographic controls (panel A) include BMI, BMI squared, height, and height squared. Panel B adds draft status
controls, as described in the Data section of the paper, and the number of NFL participants from each player's college. High injury
positions are tight ends, defensive lineman, wide receivers, and running backs; high concussion positions are quarterbacks,
defensive backs, running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends. Low injury and low concussion positions are the respective
complements, including kickers. I derive 95 percent confidence intervals (in square brackets) from robust standard errors.
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Table 13. More than Three Years Played and Percent Mortality due to Selected Causes of Death
Age < 40 Age < 50 Age < 60 Age < 65 Age < 70
Any 0.109 0.958 2.164 0.389 1.052
(0.353) (0.694) (1.528) (2.507) (4.616)
Cardiovascular 0.174 0.504* 1.708*** 1.614* 2.635
(0.134) (0.295) (0.438) (0.859) (1.657)
Cancer 0.021 0.321 0.901 1.872** 3.811***
(0.133) (0.303) (0.666) (0.754) (1.120)
Transport Accident -0.224 -0.183 0.488*** 0.569** 0.394
(0.198) (0.259) (0.183) (0.244) (0.319)
Other External 0.114 -0.005 -0.618 -0.631 -0.746
(0.132) (0.267) (0.566) (0.787) (1.221)
Missing -0.115 -0.019 -0.484 -3.792* -7.307*
(0.175) (0.420) (1.149) (2.089) (4.024)
Degenerative*, 0.092** 0.156*** 0.014 0.115 1.478**
Suicide (0.042) (0.059) (0.300) (0.530) (0.628)
Degenerative*, 0.122*** 0.311*** 0.328 0.317 1.478**
Suicide, Drugs/Alcohol (0.045) (0.093) (0.331) (0.546) (0.628)
N 6,665 4,549 2,383 1,558 750
*ALS, Parkinson's, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, Dementia, Alzheimer's
Note: OLS regressions include position and NFL entry year fixed effects, a third degree polynomial in date of
birth, baseline BMI, BMI squared, height, height squared, and draft status controls, as described in the Data
section of the paper. Coefficients are measured in percentage points. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 14. More than Three Years Played and Percent Mortality due to Selected Causes of Death (High Concussion Risk)
Age<40 Age<50 Age<60 Age<65 Age<70
Any -0.044 1.339* 2.755 1.270 4.418
(0.452) (0.777) (1.730) (3.191) (5.519)
Cardiovascular 0.158* 0.444 1.113* 1.100 1.937
(0.082) (0.339) (0.631) (1.072) (2.653)
Cancer 0.149* 0.676*** 0.919 1.956 5.144***
(0.087) (0.237) (0.951) (1.258) (1.750)
Transport Accident -0.156 0.094 0.427* 0.602 --
(0.222) (0.064) (0.258) (0.381) --
Other External 0.026 -0.017 -0.152 0.405 0.226
(0.209) (0.302) (0.457) (0.271) (0.526)
Missing -0.336 -0.241 -0.024 -3.302 -7.045
(0.303) (0.572) (1.184) (2.545) (4.663)
Degenerative*, 0.064 0.090 -0.373 -0.368 1.302*
Suicide (0.051) (0.057) (0.534) (0.986) (0.774)
Degenerative*, 0.074 0.304** 0.083 0.003 1.302*
Suicide, Drugs/Alcohol (0.052) (0.130) (0.587) (1.015) (0.774)
N 3,421 2,316 1,198 772 377
*ALS, Parkinson's, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, Dementia, Alzheimer's
Note: OLS regressions include position and NFL entry year fixed effects, a third degree polynomial in date of birth, baseline BMI,
BMI squared, height, height squared, and draft status controls, as described in the Data section of the paper. Coefficients are
measured in percentage points. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 15. More than Three Years Played and Percent Mortality due to Selected Causes of Death (Low Concussion Risk)
Age<40 Age<50 Age<60 Age<65 Age<70
Any 0.386 1.231 1.089 0.315 -0.026
(0.634) (1.299) (2.863) (4.098) (8.077)
Cardiovascular 0.180 0.706 2.062*** 2.986*** 3.671*
(0.334) (0.548) (0.599) (0.976) (2.043)
Cancer -0.142 -0.004 1.268 2.301*** 4.426**
(0.305) (0.734) (0.964) (0.835) (1.978)
Transport Accident -0.326 -0.122 0.598* 0.819* 0.922
(0.396) (0.450) (0.332) (0.477) (0.749)
Other External 0.238* 0.031 -1.102 -1.863 -1.845
(0.130) (0.530) (1.150) (1.703) (2.466)
Missing 0.230* 0.308 -1.544 -4.929 -7.112
(0.135) (0.698) (2.297) (3.613) (7.166)
Degenerative*, 0.152* 0.316* 0.560** 0.764* 2.100*
Suicide (0.091) (0.170) (0.278) (0.391) (1.141)
Degenerative*, 0.206** 0.396** 0.691** 0.764* 2.100*
Suicide, Drugs/Alcohol (0.099) (0.185) (0.297) (0.391) (1.141)
N 3,006 2,062 1,108 740 354
*ALS, Parkinson's, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, Dementia, Alzheimer's
Note: OLS regressions include position and NFL entry year fixed effects, a third degree polynomial in date of birth, baseline BMI,
BMI squared, height, height squared, and draft status controls, as described in the Data section of the paper. Coefficients are
measured in percentage points. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1. NFL Player BMI Over Time
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Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for NFL Players and the General Population
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Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves by Career Length, High Injury Risk Positions
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Chapter 2
When Opportunity Knocks, Who Answers? New Evidence on College Achievement Awards
with
Joshua Angrist
Ford Professor of Economics, MIT
and
Philip Oreopoulos
Professor of Economics, University of Toronto
We evaluate the effects of academic achievement awards for first and second-year college students
studying at a Canadian commuter college. The award scheme offered linear cash incentives for course
grades above 70. Awards were paid every term. Program participants also had access to peer advising by
upperclassmen. Program engagement appears to have been high but overall treatment effects were
small. The intervention increased the number of courses graded above 70 and points earned above 70
for second-year students, but generated no significant effect on overall GPA. Results are somewhat
stronger for a subsample that correctly reproduced the program rules.
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I. Introduction
As college enrollment rates have increased, so too have concerns about rates of college
completion. Around 45 percent of United States college students and nearly 25 percent of Canadian
college students fail to complete any college program within six years of postsecondary enrollment
(Shaienks and Gluszynksi 2007; Shapiro et al. 2012). Those who do finish now take much longer than
they used to (Turner 2004; Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 2010; Babcock and Marks 2011). Delays and
dropouts may be both privately and socially costly. Struggling college students often show little evidence
of skill improvement (Arum and Roksa 2011). They pay a higher cost in foregone earnings than those
who do finish, while losing the benefit of any possible "sheepskin effects" from degree completion. Time
on campus is also subsidized at public colleges and universities, so repeated course failures and long
completion times are costly for taxpayers. A recent analysis by Harris and Goldrick-Rab (2010) shows
steadily declining degree-to-expenditure ratios in American public colleges, a trend generated by falling
completion rates as well as increasing sticker prices.
In an effort to boost grades and on-time graduation rates, most universities deploy an array of
support services. These efforts reflect a practical response to an important problem, but evidence that
academic support services improve outcomes is mixed at best. A randomized trial discussed by Scrivener
and Weiss (2009) finds that campus support services generate small improvements in grades and reduce
student attrition, but Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) and MacDonald, Bernstein, and Price (2009)
find virtually no effect from support services. Part of the problem seems to be that take-up rates for
most support services are low. More pro-active programs that facilitate higher take-up and more
intensive support have been found to be more successful than relatively passive interventions offering
only "service availability" (Scrivener, Sommo, and Collado 2009; Bettinger and Baker 2011).
A parallel effort to boost college achievement and completion looks to financial incentives.
Traditional need-based grant aid - which makes up the bulk of North American aid - flows to recipients
in a manner that is mostly independent of academic performance, while embedding little incentive for
timely degree completion. Merit-based aid, on the other hand, depends on academic achievement.
Most merit awards go to top performing students, who can be expected to do reasonably well with or
without support. Performance-based awards for students not already on top are a new but rapidly
expanding policy development. If successful, such awards may improve academic outcomes, increase
the rate of degree completion, and ultimately save both taxpayers and recipients money.
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Georgia's Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) program, introduced in 1993, is a
pioneering effort in this direction. Funded by lottery ticket sales, HOPE covers tuition and fees at any
Georgia public college or university for students who earned at least a 3.0 high school GPA. Students
lose the HOPE scholarship if their college GPA dips below 3.0. Georgia HOPE has been a model for
dozens of similar state programs. Accumulating empirical evidence suggests HOPE-like award schemes
improve high school achievement (see, for example, Pallais 2009). On the other hand, such programs
also appear to reduce recipients' college course loads (Cornwell et al. 2005), increase their automobile
consumption (Cornwell and Mustard 2007), and reduce attendance at out-of-state colleges and college
quality (Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2006; Cohodes and Goodman 2013).
Estimates of the effects of HOPE-style programs on college enrollment and completion are
mixed. Dynarski (2008) reports large increases in Georgia and Arkansas's college-educated populations a
few years after the introduction of HOPE and a similar Arkansas program, while Castleman (2013)
estimates that Florida's HOPE-style public university scholarship boosted recipients' in-state public
college completion rates. By contrast, recent analyses by Sjoquist and Winters (2012a; 2012b) find no
effect when looking at a broader range of state programs with more recent data and updated clustered
standard error estimation.
Most research on HOPE-style programs uses observational designs. Among the most credible of
the HOPE-style evaluations, Scott-Clayton's (2011) regression discontinuity investigation of West
Virginia's Providing Real Opportunities for Maximizing In-State Student Excellence (PROMISE)
scholarship generates evidence of substantial increases in four and five-year graduation rates.
Importantly, however, this study shows the PROMISE scholarship increased GPAs and credits earned
during the first three years of college only, when students faced a minimum GPA requirement to
maintain award eligibility. This suggests that the incentive effects of the scholarships are larger than the
income effects resulting from greater financial aid.
Incentive experiments and quasi-experimental research designs in European universities have
also produced mixed results. Using a regression-discontinuity design, Garibaldi et al. (2012) found that
higher tuition induces faster degree completion by Italian women. De Paola, Scoppa, and Nistico (2012)
also find substantial positive effects of a randomized financial award for business administration
students in southern Italy. On the other hand, randomized evaluations of financial incentives offered to
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Dutch university students generated little overall effect (Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw 2010;
Leuven, et al. 2011).18
In an effort to encourage on-time completion and retention, a few incentive programs target
college credits for those already enrolled. In a randomized evaluation managed by MDRC, Barrow et al.
(2012) find significant effects on credit accumulation for a subsample of Louisiana community college
students enrolled at least half time. Early results from a series of similar randomized evaluations show
small but statistically significant increases in cumulative earned credits by the first or second term (Cha
and Patel 2010; Miller et al. 2011; Richburg-Hayes, Sommo, and Welbeck 2011). Evaluating a Canadian
community college retention program, MacDonald et al. (2009) report significant increases in GPA and
retention; this program paid $750 per semester for those with a GPA above 2.0, who maintained a full
load and made use of academic services.
Motivated by the wide range of findings to date, we implemented a financial incentive
demonstration program that builds on the lessons from earlier work, including ours. Overall academic
performance in our study population was poor. Our merit aid therefore rewarded above-average
performance for enrolled students. Specifically, the "Opportunity Knocks" (OK) experiment, piloted at a
large Canadian commuter university, was designed to explore whether students who qualify for need
aid can also be motivated by merit aid, and whether this improved performance would carry over into
subsequent years. Incentivizing higher grades in one year could generate better subsequent
performance through habit formation or learning by doing, even after incentives disappear.
OK was offered to first- and second-year students who applied for financial aid. Those who
signed up were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In contrast to earlier programs that
primarily rewarded students for achieving GPA thresholds, treated students earned $100 for each class
in which they attained a grade of 70 or better and an additional $20 for each percentage point above 70
percent (roughly the average grade in the control group). A student with a full course load scoring 75 in
every course qualified for $2,000 over the course of the school year (10 x ($100 + (5 x $20))). Treated
18 Randomized trials and quasi-experimental evaluations of financial incentives have been somewhat more
encouraging for elementary and secondary students than for college students. Studies showing substantial positive
effects on primary or secondary school students include Angrist et al. (2002), Henry and Rubinstein (2002), Kremer,
Miguel, and Thornton (2009), Angrist and Lavy (2009), Dearden et al. (2009), Pallais (2009), and Dee (2011). Also in
a primary or secondary context, Fryer (2012) reports large effects of aligned parent, teacher, and student
incentives and Levitt et al. (2011) demonstrate some response to immediate rewards for test performance. Other
recent experimental studies at this level have generated less reason for optimism. See, for example, Bettinger
(2012), Rodriguez-Planas (2010), and Fryer (2011), who evaluate an array of award schemes for primary and
middle school students in a variety of settings. For a general review of research on financial incentives, see Gneezy,
Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011).
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students also had the opportunity to interact with randomly assigned peer advisors. These were upper-
class students who had been trained to provide advice about study strategies, time management, and
university bureaucracy.
OK was developed in view of the findings from our earlier randomized evaluation on a similar
campus. The Student Achievement and Retention (STAR) project (Angrist, et al. 2009) offered three
interventions, the most successful of which combined financial incentives at widely spaced GPA
thresholds with academic support services. OK provided an opportunity for replication and the chance
to offer a more intense and perhaps even more successful treatment. By rewarding performance in each
class and setting a low bar for the minimum payment, we hoped to make incentives stronger (92
percent of controls earned a grade of 70 percent or above in at least one class). This contrasts with STAR
awards, which were paid out to only about 18 percent of eligible students. We opted for a partially
linear payout scheme on theoretical grounds (see, for example, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987).
OK awards were potentially more generous than those offered in STAR; high achievers could
earn up to $700 per class.' 9 The expected OK award among controls was $1,330, while the expected
STAR award was only about $400. OK engendered more program engagement than STAR as well: Almost
90 percent of OK participants had some kind of interaction with peer advisors and/or the program
website, in contrast with about 50 percent engagement in STAR.
OK had many novel and promising features: linear incentives at the class level, high reward
levels, and high program engagement. It's therefore interesting, surprising, and somewhat disappointing
that OK had only a modest impact on targeted outcomes. Treated second-year students earned about
13 percent more than expected based on the distribution of control-group grades, suggesting the
program had an incentive effect. The strongest effects appear around the $100 award threshold, where
completion of payment-qualifying courses increased, especially among students who appeared to
understand the program well. OK also increased the number of second-year courses graded above 70
and grade points earned above 70, but these effects were not large enough to generate a significant
increase in students' overall GPAs. OK generated no discernible impacts in the year after incentives were
removed.
The following section describes the OK campus setting, program rules, and our random-
assignment research design. Section III reports descriptive statistics and indicators of program
engagement. Section IV discusses the experimental results while Section V reports on participants'
impressions of the program as revealed in post-program surveys. The paper concludes in Section VI with
19 Tuition at this university is around $5,000 per year.
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a brief look at how our results fit in with other post-secondary incentive demonstrations. We also
discuss possible explanations for differences between the findings reported here and those in our earlier
study.
II. Background and Research Design
Motivated by the mixed results for college incentives to date, we developed an intervention
meant to build on what we saw as the strongest features of the program discussed in Angrist, et al.
(2009). The OK intervention combined incentives with academic support services; a combination of
incentives and services appeared to be especially effective in the earlier STAR evaluation, which ran in a
similar setting. The services delivered through STAR were more elaborate and expensive, however. STAR
included the opportunity to participate in facilitated study groups as well as email-based peer
mentoring, while OK services consisted of email-based peer mentoring only. We opted for email
because the take-up rate for STAR's facilitated study groups was low. Also, because a number of STAR
participants saw the awards as essentially out of reach, OK award rates were designed to be much
higher. OK awards were also paid out more frequently, in this case, every term. Unlike STAR, the OK
study population consisted only of students that had applied for financial aid prior to the start of the
school year. This was partly in response to political constraints but it also seemed likely that aid
recipients would be most responsive to the opportunity to earn additional awards.
Opportunity Knocks (OK) was piloted on an Ontario commuter campus affiliated with a large
public university. The six-year completion rate on this campus is about 73 percent. There are about
2,500 students in an entering class. In late summer of 2008, we invited 1,056 first years and 1,073
second years to participate in OK. Eligible students are those who had requested financial aid, had an
email address, had a high school GPA recorded in the university administrative information system, and
who had enrolled for at least 1.5 credits for the upcoming fall term. Invitees who completed the intake
survey and gave consent were eligible for random assignment. Of the 1,271 students who completed
the survey and were eligible, 400 were treated. Treatment assignment was stratified by year (first and
second) and sex, with 100 in each group. Within sex-year cells, assignment was stratified by high school
GPA quartile, with 25 in each group (the analysis below controls for strata).
Previous studies have generally rewarded students for completing courses or reaching GPA
thresholds (see, for example, Angrist et al. 2009, Cha and Patel 2010). In contrast, OK participants
earned $100 for each class in which they received at least a 70 percent grade, and an additional $20 for
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each percentage point above 70.20 For example, a student who earned a grade of 75 in each of five
classes over one semester (five classes constitute a full load) would have received 5 x ($100 + (5 x $20))
= $1,000. We focused on grades near 70 because anything worse is typically seen as unsatisfactory and
because awards for lower levels of achievement are likely to be prohibitively expensive (a GPA of at
least C- is required for graduation; this translates to a percentage grade in the low 60s). Still, a grade of
70 is attainable for most students in at least one class, and the OK awards schedule provided incentives
for above-average performance as well.
The services component of OK assigned treated students to (trained and paid) same-sex peer
advisors. Peer advisors were enthusiastic upper-year students or recent graduates with good grades.
Each peer advisor covered 50 participants. Advisors emailed advisees once every two to three weeks,
whether or not the advisees responded. These emails offered advice on upcoming academic events and
workshops and guidance relevant to key periods in the academic calendar, such as midterms and finals.
Advisors also provided information about OK scholarships, including reminders of the scholarship
calculation and payment schedules. Advisors frequently invited their clients to turn to them for help
with any academic or personal issues that seemed relevant to academic success.
Ill. Descriptive Statistics and Program Response
The data for this study come primarily from the university records containing information on
applicants, enrolled students, and course grades. We supplemented this with data from a baseline
survey used to identify the population eligible for random assignment, as well as more descriptive focus-
group style information collected from a few subjects after the experiment.
Table 1, which presents descriptive statistics, shows that OK participants were mostly college
students of traditional age. Control group students had average grades around 82 percent in high
school. Less than half of the control group spoke English as a first language, reflecting the relatively high
proportion of immigrants on the OK host campus. About half of control group parents graduated from a
postsecondary institution (44 percent of mothers and 53 percent of fathers), while nearly 80 percent of
parents graduated from high school, a figure comparable to the Canadian average for college student
parents. The OK scholarships were within reach for most participants: 92 percent of controls would have
received an award under the OK scholarship formula. Table 1 also documents the fact that random
assignment successfully balanced the background characteristics of those in the treatment and control
groups (as evidenced by insignificant effects in the "Treatment Difference" columns). Although not
Payoffs were doubled and issued in the spring for year-long courses.
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documented in the table, student course selection and completion as measured by number of courses,
difficulty, or subject area are also well balanced between treatment and control groups for the whole
sample and within subgroups (random assignment occurred after students had pre-registered for
courses).21
The OK intake survey, included in the packet describing the program to those eligible for
random assignment, included two questions meant to gauge subjects' understanding of program award
rules. The first asked students to calculate the award amount for one class, and the second asked them
to calculate the total award amount from five classes. Two-thirds of the students answered the second
question correctly (documented in Table 1), and over 80 percent answered the first question correctly.
Those who responded incorrectly to either question received a clarification by email. In the program
analysis, we look at treatment effects for the entire sample and for those who answered the second
assessment question correctly to see if those who understood the scholarship formula also had a
stronger program response.
Student involvement with OK was high. This can be seen in Table 2, which shows that about 73
percent of treated students checked their scholarship earnings on the program website. Women were
nine points more likely to check than men. Only 38 percent of treated participants sent an email to their
assigned peer advisor in the fall, but this number increased to 50 percent in the spring. By year's end, 70
percent had emailed an advisor at least once over the course of the year. First-year students and women
were more likely to contact advisors than were second-year students and men. At least 86 percent of
treated students made some kind of program contact: they emailed a peer advisor, checked scholarship
earnings, or emailed program staff.
Following a presentation of intention-to-treat effects, we discuss two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimates of treatment effects using a dummy indicating any program contact as the endogenous
variable. The idea here is that subjects who made no program contact of any kind, and did not even
check their scholarship earnings, are unlikely to have been affected by either OK awards or advisor
services. In other words, we think of a dummy indicating any contact as a good surrogate for program
treatment status. 2SLS estimates treating program contact as an endogenous variable should therefore
capture the effect of treatment on the treated for the subpopulation of active program participants
(because endogenous compliance is one-sided, the local average treatment effect is the treatment on
the treated effect; see Imbens and Angrist, 1994, for details).
2 Attrition was also balanced between treatment and control (about 5 percent of OK participants dropped out
during the study), and treatment and control group dropouts have similar characteristics (results are available
upon request).
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IV. Program Effects
A. Main Findings
A natural starting point for our analysis is a comparison of the amount earned by the
experimental group with the earnings that students in the control group would have been entitled to
had they been in the program. A large program effect should be reflected in larger-than expected
earnings, where expected earnings are measured using the grade distribution in the control sample.
Our estimates of earnings and other effects come from regressions like this one:
yi;= a + 6T + 6'X + ej, (1)
where y;; is the outcome for student i in stratum j, the a1 are strata effects, T is a treatment assignment
indicator, and Xi is a vector of additional controls.2 1 Causal effects of the OK program are captured by 6.
Since treatment is randomly assigned, covariates are unnecessary to reduce omitted variables bias in
the estimated treatment effects. Models with covariates may, however, generate more precise
estimates.
The OK program had no impact on earnings for first-year men and women, a result that can be
seen in columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 3. On the other hand, there is some evidence of higher-than-
expected earnings for second-year treated students, especially second-year men. The estimated effect
on second-year men in the spring term, reported in column 5, is a significant 170 dollars. Estimates over
the course of the year are about 255 dollars for second-year men and 180 dollars for all second years.24
Both of these estimates are significant at better than a 10 percent level and amount to 15-20 percent of
a standard deviation of hypothetical control group earnings.
Our experimental design stratifies on sex, year of study, and high school GPA, mitigating
concerns about mining for significant findings in subgroups. The analysis by sex and class is of
substantive interest and a pre-specified feature of our research plan. Still, it's worth noting that under
the null hypothesis of no treatment effect for all four sex by class subgroups, the probability that at least
one observed full-year effect is significant at the 8 percent level is 1 - 0.924 = 0.28 (assuming no
2 Ashenfelter and Plant (1990) use a similar hypothetical payment outcome to measure the labor supply effects of
exposure to a negative income tax.
2 Additional controls include parental education, an indicator for English mother tongue, and indicators for
students who answered scholarship formula questions correctly.
24 Restricting the fall and spring samples to be the same as the full-year sample generates effects for the full year
equal to the sum of the fall and spring effects. Estimated effects for the full year need not equal the sum (or
average) of the two semester effects because the full-year sample differs slightly from the sample for either
semester alone.
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outcomes correlation across subgroups). The results in Table 3 emerge more strongly, however, when
we limit the sample to students who understood the award formula well and are consistent with a
marked response in grades around the 70 percent award threshold, as discussed below.
The question of whether the OK program caused more complex distributional shifts in
hypothetical earnings is explored in Figure 1, which shows treatment and control earnings distributions
in separate panels by sex and year. The only (marginally) significant distributional contrast in the figure
is for second-year men (using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). On the other hand, the contrast by treatment
status for second-year women looks similar to that for men. For both men and women, treatment
seems to have shifted second-year earnings from below a level around 1,500 to more than 1,500 dollars.
The shift emerges roughly one hundred dollars above mean earnings for controls.
The evidence for an effect on average grades (measured on a 0-100 scale) and GPA is weaker
than that for earnings. The grades results appear in Table 4a and the GPA results appear in Table 4b.
Average grades for second-year men increased by about 2.5 percentage points in the spring but this
estimate is only marginally significant, and it's the only significant result in the table. The corresponding
GPA effect amounts to about 0.27 GPA points, an estimate significant at the 5 percent level.2 s Power is
not an issue with these comparisons. For the full sample, we are able to reject GPA and grade effects as
small as 10 percent of the control standard deviation, meaning that our zeros are quite precise.
The earnings gains documented in Table 3 are necessarily explained by increases in the number
of courses graded at least 70 and grade points over 70. Table 5 reports full-year program effects on each
of these components of the scholarship award formula. Panel A shows effects on the number of courses
in which a student earned a grade of at least 70. Treatment appears to have increased the number of
over-70 grades awarded to second-year men by almost a full course. The number of over-70 courses
increases by about half a course for all second years. These estimates are reasonably precise. On the
other hand, the estimated effects on grade points earned over 70 are not estimated very precisely. The
only (marginally) significant point gain is for all second years, an effect of 6.2 percentage points. It's also
worth noting, however, that the magnitudes come out such that effects on total earnings are equally
distributed between a threshold effect at 70 and awards for points over 70.
OK may have had a weaker effect on grades and GPA than on earnings because students
substituted effort from classes with a grade above 70 to classes with a grade below 70. To test this claim
and look for additional evidence of effects concentrated around the award threshold, we estimated
25 GPA is not a linear transformation of average grades, so we expect slight differences in results. Effects on GPA
should be more similar to effects on earnings, since GPA also jumps at 70 percent.
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treatment effects on indicators for grade>g, where g runs from 60 to 80 (reported in Figure 2; these
plots also show the control grade distribution). This investigation uncovers no negative treatment
effects on courses above the higher thresholds, suggesting that students generally did not substitute
effort from higher- to lower-graded courses.26
We found no evidence of an increased likelihood of crossing any threshold for first years.
Treatment appears to have increased the likelihood that second-year women earned a grade of 72-74, a
series of effects concentrated around the minimum award threshold. Effects concentrated around the
threshold may be evidence of strategic grade-seeking behavior on the part of treated students. For
example, students who expected a grade around 68 or 69 may have made a special effort (through
negotiation or extra work) to clear 70. On the other hand, treatment appears to have boosted the
grades of second-year men over a wide interval running from 60-75 percent. This pattern of effects
weighs against a negotiation-based view of the incentive response, at least among men.
Although most students appeared to understand the OK program rules and award formula, a
non-trivial minority did not. Those who misunderstood the formula linking grades and awards seem less
likely to have been motivated by the awards. We therefore report estimates for a sample restricted to
participants who correctly applied the OK earnings formula to an example in the baseline survey
(information collected before random assignment). Two-thirds of the sample evaluated the example
correctly.
Extrapolation from this selected subgroup is necessarily speculative, but if we assume that only
those who understand the program change their behavior in response to OK incentives, average causal
effects on those who understand program rules provide a measure of "theoretical effectiveness."
Specifically, this parameter captures an upper bound for what the program might do when it becomes
part of the routine. We'd expect to approach this bound over time, were schemes like OK a regular part
of the college landscape. Estimates limited to the correct-responders sample are reported in Table 6.
Estimates for correct responders show larger program effects on earnings than the estimates
computed using the full sample. Specifically, earnings gains are estimated to have been 370 for second-
year men and 245 for all second years, both significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, neither
GPA nor grade effects are significantly different from zero. The apparent difference in findings for
grades and earnings is explained by the last two rows of Table 6, which reports estimates for the
components of the award formula in the restricted sample. These estimates show reasonably clear
2 Similar analysis on courses graded above thresholds from 80 to 100 percent demonstrates little difference
between treatment and control students.
42
effects on the number of courses above 70 with weaker effects on points earned above. The shift in
grades around the 70 percent threshold was apparently inadequate to boost overall GPA by a
statistically significant amount.
Given the modest program effects observed during the treatment period, it seems unlikely that
OK boosted achievement substantially in the longer-run. This conjecture is confirmed in Table 7, which
reports full-sample treatment effects for fall 2009 (the semester after the program ended). The results
in Table 7 show marginally significant positive effects on average grades and GPA for first-year women
and in the pooled sample of first years (who are second years in the post-treatment period), but these
effects are small. The post-program outcomes also offer a specification test for the analysis above, since
we would not expect to see threshold effects around 70 percent in the post-program period. There is no
evidence of a treatment effect on the number of fall 2009 courses graded at or above 70 percent.
B. Subgroup Differences
The results presented differ by gender and year in school. First years do not appear to have
responded to the OK program at all, while treated second years - particularly second-year men -
showed some improvement in grades, especially in courses graded over 70. Although we cannot be sure
why results differ by sex and class, we hypothesize that first-years did not respond as strongly because
many first-year students have not yet developed successful study techniques, raising their costs of grade
improvement beyond OK's marginal returns.
The impact range of OK's marginal incentives might also depend on how well students can target
their grades. For example, a student with accurate grade knowledge may only respond to the $100
payment at 70 if she has a course currently graded just below 70. A student with inaccurate or imprecise
grade knowledge may respond to the $100 payment even if his actual grades are well below or above
70. A possible explanation for the gender difference in our findings is a female advantage in effort
targeting in response to the $100 payment. Figure 2 (discussed in detail above) shows localized positive
treatment effects for second-year women around 72 to 73 percent, resulting in little effect on grades
overall. Treated second-year men, however, increased courses graded above most thresholds from 60 to
75, contributing to stronger overall effects. It also seems likely that more-experienced second years
could target grades better than first years, though high improvement costs for first years appear to have
overwhelmed the marginal incentives.
2 Roughly 100 program participants dropped out between the first and second years. Dropout rates were similar
in the treatment and control groups.
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C. Additional Results
We might expect OK incentives to be more powerful for financially constrained students. But
treatment effects come out similar in subgroups defined by expected financial aid and whether students
expressed concerns about funding. Effects are somewhat larger in the subsample of students whose
parents had not been to college than among those with college-educated parents, but the gap by
parents' schooling is not large or precisely estimated.
Effort substitution from easy to hard classes might also explain the small treatment effects. To
maximize their award, OK participants should substitute effort from difficult classes to easy classes,
where the financial return to effort is higher. However, treatment effects do not vary by class difficulty,
as measured by the average class grade among control students (results available upon request). As
noted above, course enrollment, difficulty, and completion are also unaffected, and students do not
appear to substitute effort to focus solely on the larger incentive at 70 percent.
The effects of program assignment reported in Tables 3 to 7 are diluted by non-compliance,
that is, by the fact that some of those assigned to treatment did not really participate in the program
because they were unaware of their assignment or uninterested in the program offerings. It's therefore
worth estimating the effect of the scholarship and advisor treatment on program participants. The
decision to engage with the program is not randomly assigned; this is a choice made by those offered
the opportunity to participate. However, we can use the randomly assigned offer of OK treatment as an
instrument for program take-up. By virtue of random assignment the OK offer is unrelated to
characteristics of eligible students. The OK offer is also highly correlated with participation status: As
shown in Table 2, 86 percent of those offered OK were engaged in some way - either through
program/advisor contact or through checking scholarship earnings - while no one in the control group
had access to OK awards or services. We assume that those with no program engagement were
unaware of and therefore unaffected by the OK awards and services. The overall first stage effect of OK
offers on participation (awareness) is around 0.88, controlling for strata (see Table 8). Moreover,
because no one in the control group participated, 2SLS estimates in this case capture the effect of
treatment on the full sample of program participants, as described in Bloom (1984) and Imbens and
Angrist (1994). Program participants are a self-selected group, but effects of OK on these students are of
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interest because they tell us how much achievement was boosted for those who were clearly aware of
and responded to program opportunities in some measurable way.2 8
The first stage effect of OK offers on participation rates is between 0.84 and 0.9 in the full
sample and between 0.86 and 0.92 in the subsample that appears to have understood OK program
rules. The first-stage estimates appear in the first row of each panel in Table 8, which also reports 2SLS
estimates of the effect of participation on participants. Adjusting reduced-form offer effects (the
estimates of program effects reported in Tables 3-6) for non-compliance necessarily leads to somewhat
larger treatment effects, in this case larger by about 10-20 percent.
The most impressive effects in Table 8 are for the number of courses in which students earned a
grade above 70. Here, effects on second years in the full sample are on the order of two-thirds of a
course, while the gains among those who understood the program well amount to almost a full course
(an estimate of 0.91 with a standard error of 0.33, reported at the bottom of column 8). The last column
of Table 8 shows a marginally significant effect on the number of courses in which students earned at
least 70 among all students who understood the program well (pooling men and women, and first and
second years). The effect for all men is also significant at the 5 percent level in this sample, with a
marginally significant impact on second-year women. A robust and substantial impact on hypothetical
earnings and points above 70 also emerges from the 2SLS estimates in Panel B. At the same time,
neither the earnings effects nor the increase in the number of courses graded above 70 translated into
higher overall average grades among participants.
V. Student Impressions
The OK sign-up survey asked students to predict their average grades in two scenarios, one as an
OK participant and one as a non-participant. To encourage a thoughtful response to this question, we
offered those who answered the opportunity to win a $500 prize to be given to the student whose
predictions came closest to the mark. About 60 percent predicted the same grade either way and the
average predicted effect on grades was about 2.2 points. This is considerably larger than most of the
effects reported in Tables 6 and 8. It also seems noteworthy that those who predicted a positive
response do not appear to have responded more strongly than those who predicted no effect.
28 Some students may have been aware of the financial awards, even though they failed to check their earnings or
otherwise engage with the program. In this case, the reported first stage effects on participation/awareness will be
slightly too small, leading to inflated 2SLS estimates. Also, there is control noncompliance in the sense that control
students have access to standard university support services. Therefore, the support services aspect of the OK
treatment should be interpreted as a more engaging addition to a similar service, rather than a new program
implemented in a vacuum (Heckman et al. 2000).
45
After the program ended, we asked students who predicted no effect in the intake survey why
they had expected this. Of the 226 emails sent to treated participants predicting no effect, only 34
responded. Most of these respondents said they were planning to do as well as possible either way. For
example, one said: "Before starting courses, I had already decided that I would do my best. And so, I felt
a scholarship would be an added motivation, but fundamentally it came down to my own ability and
commitment." Two thought the award was too remote, commenting: "I predicted the program would
have no effect because it provides a long-term reward for regular short-term behavior (daily intense
studying)." Only three respondents said the incentives were too small. One said OK was "not too catchy
and/or something worth dying for." Another mentioned the 70 percent threshold: "I believe the cash
reward for each course was not high enough per percentage point above 70 percent. If the cash reward
was perhaps 30 or 40 dollars per percent point above 70 percent, I would've worked even harder."
We also surveyed a random sample of 50 students from the treatment group at the end of the
school year (May 13, 2009), offering $25 movie gift certificates to those who responded. Among the 30
respondents to this survey, 27 said the scholarships motivated them. Some thought the program was
very effective. For example, one respondent commented: "Every time I began to lose interest in a
particular course, I would remind myself that I just need to well . . . keep with it; the rewards will be
tremendous. A scholarship is one such reward . . . and it sure is helpful, as it lifts a lot of the financial
burdens I'm faced with when it comes to paying tuition & other fees." Others saw the program was
somewhat effective, as in this comment: "This scholarship did affect my motivation to study at some
point . . ." Respondents often cited concerns about tuition and fees as a motivating factor that boosted
their interest in OK.
Half of the post-program treated respondents felt the program led them to study more, though
some felt their opportunity for more study time was limited. This comment was typical: "The program
made me study more, but not much. I usually follow my schedule between work and school. So the
amount of time I could have spent on study is somehow limited." Others felt the program helped them
focus on schoolwork: "As someone who gets sidetracked easily, I kept it in mind that staying focused
would pay off in more than one way, and so yes, it did affect the amount of time I devoted to studying."
Another said, "I think what's great about the program is that when you feel like you're beginning to
procrastinate, you think about the outcome of this program and want to get back to studying." On the
other hand, one second-year student reporting feeling somewhat demoralized by OK: "I did abnormally
poor this year compared to my usual standards and it just so happened to coincide with Opportunity
Knocks. The money reminder just kind of made me feel 'worse' about myself."
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Among those who responded to the post-program follow-up survey, almost all felt the program
improved their academic performance. Some appreciated the opportunity to earn scholarships for good
but not necessarily outstanding grades: "Personally, I don't find that [the university] offers as many
scholarship opportunities as other [universities], so I think it was rewarding to know that my academic
performance was acknowledged and rewarded." Some felt they increased performance out of financial
concerns: "[E]specially now with the economic downfall, it is extremely difficult to muster up the
finances to help pay for tuition without relying on OSAP [financial aid]. I kind of looked at Opportunity
Knocks as my employer who gives me more money the better I performed in my studies." One student
volunteered the view that the program would have a long-lasting effect on him/her: "The program had
significantly improved my grades! And I cannot wait to see what I can accomplish next year."
Everyone we contacted afterwards reported that they received peer advisor e-mails about once
or twice a month. All but one of the respondents said the advisor e-mails were helpful. One noted, "I
think the advisor made good decisions between sending us important reminders and information
without being redundant. It was especially important to receive the e-mails about the scholarship
money quickly after marks were sent in." Another said, "I find it very useful that someone was actually
helping me through school." All but one respondent felt the program was worth continuing. Virtually
everyone seemed grateful for having being selected for OK. One respondent closed with this
endorsement: "The OK Program has been an essential part of my student experience, and in many ways
crucial to my academic performance. I think that having a peer advisor as opposed to just the regular
counselors working in the University is very important. With all the stress that universities cause their
students - financially or otherwise, it's really nice to know there is a program like Opportunity Knocks to
help students every step of the way." Overall, this feedback leaves us feeling that most treated students
were aware of and engaged with OK, and that a large minority expected some benefit. Others who
thought the program would have little effect seem to feel this way because they were already anxious to
succeed and willing to devote time to their studies.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The OK program was popular with participants: sign-up rates and program engagement were
high, and in follow-up focus group interviews many program participants were enthusiastic about their
experiences. This enthusiasm probably reflects the high award rates for OK. It's therefore disappointing
that, despite the introduction of substantial awards at almost every relevant level of achievement,
overall program effects on achievement were modest. On the plus side, treated second-year students
47
earned more in OK scholarship money than we would have expected based on the control-group grade
distribution, increased the number of courses in which they earned a grade of 70, and gained a few
grade points above 70. This localized response to the large program incentive to earn a grade of 70
percent did not translate into a substantial boost in overall achievement, though it was noticeably
stronger in the subsample of students who appear to have understood the OK award scheme well.
The past decade has seen a growing number of randomized evaluations of pay-for-performance
schemes for students at various levels and quasi-experimental studies looking at effects of state-based
merit aid programs. Table 9 summarizes studies using randomized designs to look at financial incentives
in college and Table 10 lists results from quasi-experimental studies of state-based merit scholarships.2 9
A number of randomized evaluations show effects on credits earned in response to incentives for course
completion and grade thresholds (see, for example, MacDonald et al. 2009; Cha and Patel 2010; Barrow
et al. 2012). These results, along with the findings in Angrist et al. (2009) and those reported here
suggest that students react to threshold targets more strongly than to marginal incentives beyond the
initial target. Our linear incentive scheme came with a fairly forgiving target required to get payments
started, a fact that may have induced a stronger threshold response. The OK program's novel linear
incentive of $20 per percentage point provides a lower bound (in this context at least) on the marginal
incentive needed to induce substantially higher student effort over a broad range of grades, especially
for first years.
We were also surprised when the OK demonstration failed to replicate the strong positive
results for women seen in the STAR experiment. Women may have shown a weaker, localized response
to OK because they could strategically target and attain the class-specific OK minimum award standard;
targeting the GPA award levels in STAR was likely harder. Men did not target their grades as accurately
in OK, yet they did not respond to STAR's incentives. Perhaps the STAR GPA awards were simply too
uncertain to motivate men, but at minimum, these results suggest that incentive size, targeting ability,
and gender effects matter and interact.
Incentives seem to be more effective when combined with academic support services. On
balance, however, the picture that emerges from Table 9 and from this study is one of mostly modest
effects. In particular, overall GPA seems largely unaffected except in some subgroups, and Angrist et al.
29 The studies listed in Table 9 use random assignment to evaluate financial incentives for college students. This list
is the result of a citation search (that is, citing studies we were previous-ly aware of), a keyword search (for
"experiment, incentives, college") using Google Scholar, and helpful suggestions from anonymous referees. Table
10 was constructed similarly based on studies using difference in differences, regression discontinuity, event study
designs to test impacts of state-based merit aid programs on college performance and completion.
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(2009) is the only randomized evaluation to date to find college achievement effects persisting into the
post-treatment period. Table 10 describes similarly discouraging results from studies of state-based
merit aid programs. A few studies have found positive effects, most notably Scott-Clayton's (2011)
evaluation of the West Virginia PROMISE. However, other positive results appear weaker in light of
updated empirical work (Sjoquist and Winters 2012a, 2012b) and a better understanding of selection
effects (Cohodes and Goodman 2013).
One general explanation for the muted effectiveness of merit scholarships may be that poor
performing students have trouble developing effective study strategies. For example, Israeli high school
students have easy access to test-focused study sessions in public school, a fact that may explain some
of the stronger Angrist and Lavy (2009) results on achievement awards for high school girls. Indeed,
second-year students may have responded more strongly in our study precisely because they have a
better sense for how to improve their grades. Fryer (2011) similarly argues that incentives for learning
(in his case, reading books) look more promising than pay for performance on achievement tests. These
intriguing results come from elementary and secondary school settings. Investigation of the merits of as-
yet-untried recipes combining learning incentives with academic support schemes seems a worthy
priority for future research on college achievement.
Our study also indicates that program awareness and understanding could be important aspects
of college incentive design. The positive effects of OK, though muted, are concentrated among students
who understood the awards formula well. And, about 14 percent of students assigned to treatment did
not engage with the program in any way, suggesting that treatment effects on those who were aware of
the program were actually larger than the OLS estimates. These two subgroups are not representative,
but their responses suggest that simple, high-profile programs may be more successful and that
program effects may evolve over time as awareness and understanding increase.
There are potentially unlimited variations of financial incentives alone. In the context of past
work, the Opportunity Knocks project suggests that future studies should consider all aspects of design
to have a chance at success, including incentive size, targeting ability, excitement and awareness,
simplicity, and gender considerations. In particular, students appear driven by large threshold payments
that are hard to target. Creative designs such as lottery- or games-based payments or incentives
leveraging social support or competition may be able to capitalize on this behavior, improve effort in
new ways, and keep costs low.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance by Gender
Women Men
First Years Second Years First Years Second Years All
Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age 18.2 -0.105 19.2 0.011 18.4 0.014 19.2 0.069 18.7 -0.012
[0.608] (0.056) * [0.514] (0.056) [0.815] (0.104) [0.460] (0.070) [0.757] (0.036)
High school 82.8 0.145 82.4 0.302 82.3 -0.344 82.1 -0.387 82.5 -0.024
grade average [6.56] (0.238) [6.19] (0.217) [6.44] (0.310) [6.73] (0.338) [6.44] (0.134)
1st language 0.404 0.057 0.426 -0.046 0.479 -0.060 0.333 0.097 0.416 0.009
is English [0.491] (0.056) [0.495] (0.057) [0.501] (0.065) [0.474] (0.069) [0.493] (0.031)
Mother a college 0.395 0.065 0.477 -0.016 0.479 0.050 0.424 -0.034 0.439 0.020
graduate [0.490] (0.056) [0.500] (0.058) [0.501] (0.065) [0.497] (0.070) [0.496] (0.031)
Father a college 0.479 0.051 0.581 0.009 0.603 0.047 0.475 0.105 0.532 0.049
graduate [0.500] (0.057) [0.494] (0.058) [0.491] (0.063) [0.502] (0.071) [0.499] (0.031)
Correctly answered harder 0.616 0.022 0.690 -0.010 0.719 -0.080 0.697 0.002 0.666 -0.014
question on scholarship formula [0.487] (0.053) [0.464] (0.054) [0.451] (0.061) [0.462] (0.065) [0.472] (0.029)
Controls who would have 0.883 0.968 0.908 0.978 0.923
earned some scholarship money [0.322] [0.177] [0.289] [0.148] [0.266]
Hypothetical earnings for 1,240 1,390 1,430 1,400 1,330
controls [1,220] [1,090] [1,230] [1,270] [1,190]
Observations 449 377 246 199 1,271
F test for joint significance 1.11 0.453 0.858 1.43 0.515
{0.355} {0.843} {0.525} {0.198} {0.797}
Notes: "Control Mean" columns report averages and standard deviations for variables in the left-most column, within the relevant gender-year
subgroup. "Treatment Difference" columns report coefficients from regressions of each variable in the left-most column on
with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile). The last row presents within-co
a treatment dummy,
lumn F tests of joint
significance of all treatment differences. Control group standard deviations are in square brackets, robust standard errors are in parentheses,
and p values for F tests are in curly braces. Some respondents did not answer the parents' education questions. They are coded as a separate
category ("missing") and are not coded as high school or college graduates.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2. Fraction of Treated Students Making Program-Related Contact by Gender and Year
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
Contact Type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Emailed advisor (Fall) 0.450 0.390 0.420 0.410 0.270 0.340 0.430 0.330 0.380
Emailed advisor (Spring) 0.520 0.440 0.480 0.660 0.380 0.520 0.590 0.410 0.500
Emailed advisor (Fall or 0.790 0.700 0.745 0.750 0.560 0.655 0.770 0.630 0.700
Spring)
Checked scholarship earnings 0.760 0.780 0.770 0.650 0.710 0.680 0.705 0.745 0.725
online
Emailed the program website 0.270 0.320 0.295 0.250 0.300 0.275 0.260 0.310 0.285
Any contact 0.900 0.870 0.885 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.870 0.855 0.863
Observations 100 100 200 100 100 200 200 200 400
Notes: This table shows the proportion making the indicated form of program-related contact.
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Table 3. Effects on (Hypothetical) Program Earnings
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Fall
Control 645 695 667 770 774 760 682 707 693
mean [657] [589] [628] [670] [642] [658] [663] [602] [637]
Treatment -18.8 99.7 39.9 33.9 49.2 11.9 -5.73 72.0 28.0
effect (53.1) (60.9) (39.9) (69.8) (73.1) (51.3) (41.9) (45.9) (31.1)
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1,259
Panel B. Spring
Control 589 711 640 644 655 649 605 696 642
mean [608] [598] [606] [600] [683] [633] [606] [622] [614]
Treatment -57.6 24.7 -19.1 -20.0 170 35.5 -52.5 77.3 4.47
effect (49.4) (66.4) (39.6) (59.5) (80.7) ** (49.4) (37.6) (51.0) (30.8)
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1,206
Panel C. Full Year
Control 1,240 1,390 1,300 1,430 1,400 1,420 1,290 1,390 1,330
mean [1,220] [1,090] [1,170] [1,230] [1,270] [1,240] [1,230] [1,140] [1,190]
Treatment -80.2 165 33.0 7.01 255 54.8 -64.3 180 41.1
effect (95.3) (121) (74.1) (121) (144)* (95.2) (74.3) (91.3) ** (58.2)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203
Notes: "Control Mean" rows list averages and standard deviations of program earnings, within the
relevant gender-year subgroup. "Treatment Effect" rows report coefficients from regressions of
program earnings on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and
high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language
is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly.
Control earnings are hypothetical; treated earnings are actual. Full year courses are double-weighted in
the earnings calculation. The sample used for the full year estimates includes students with grades in fall
and spring. The fall analysis omits full year courses. If we restrict the fall and spring samples to be the
same as the full year sample, then the effects for the full year are the sum of the fall and spring effects
(this is also true in later tables). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in
square brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4a. Effects on Average Grades
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Fall
Control 68.1 71.0 69.4 70.7 72.4 71.4 68.9 71.4 70.0
mean [11.6] [8.40] [10.4] [10.9] [8.39] [10.0] [11.4] [8.41] [10.3]
Treatment 0.424 0.420 0.461 0.452 -0.520 -0.496 0.236 0.064 0.076
effect (0.945) (0.947) (0.662) (1.18) (1.07) (0.827) (0.740) (0.694) (0.515)
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1,259
Panel B. Spring
Control 67.4 71.2 68.9 68.8 70.0 69.3 67.8 70.8 69.0
mean [11.3] [9.02] [10.5] [11.2] [10.6] [10.9] [11.2] [9.46] [10.6]
Treatment -0.814 -0.118 -0.471 -0.971 2.54 0.106 -0.966 0.727 -0.225
effect (1.16) (1.13) (0.801) (1.56) (1.41)* (1.03) (0.901) (0.901) (0.634)
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1,206
Panel C. Full Year
Control 67.9 71.1 69.2 69.9 71.5 70.5 68.4 71.2 69.6
mean [10.7] [7.77] [9.69] [10.3] [8.59] [9.70] [10.6] [7.99] [9.70]
Treatment -0.323 0.470 0.076 -0.233 1.17 -0.146 -0.458 0.614 -0.025
effect (0.958) (0.932) (0.662) (1.21) (1.09) (0.840) (0.745) (0.719) (0.522)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203
Notes: "Control Mean" rows list averages and standard deviations of average grades, within the relevant
gender-year subgroup. "Treatment Effect" rows report coefficients from regressions of average grades
on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (year in school, and high school grade quartile)
and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents'
education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Average grades are on
a 100 point scale. Full year courses are double-weighted in the average grade calculation. The sample
used for the full year estimates includes students with grades in fall and spring. The fall analysis omits
full year courses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4b. Effects on GPA
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Fall
Control 2.39 2.64 2.50 2.61 2.75 2.66 2.46 2.67 2.55
mean [0.982] [0.765] [0.900] [0.920] [0.743] [0.856] [0.968] [0.760] [0.890]
Treatment 0.021 0.046 0.038 0.046 -0.039 -0.034 0.014 0.015 0.009
effect (0.079) (0.081) (0.056) (0.103) (0.098) (0.073) (0.063) (0.061) (0.044)
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1,259
Panel B. Spring
Control 2.34 2.64 2.47 2.47 2.54 2.50 2.38 2.61 2.48
mean [0.916] [0.783] [0.875] [0.935] [0.880] [0.912] [0.922] [0.810] [0.885]
Treatment -0.049 0.018 -0.016 -0.003 0.266 0.071 -0.037 0.102 0.022
effect (0.081) (0.090) (0.059) (0.106) (0.119)** (0.079) (0.064) (0.073) (0.048)
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1,206
Panel C. Full Year
Control 2.37 2.64 2.49 2.55 2.67 2.59 2.42 2.65 2.52
mean [0.895] [0.689] [0.825] [0.870] [0.739] [0.822] [0.890] [0.702] [0.825]
Treatment -0.021 0.055 0.018 0.019 0.126 0.021 -0.019 0.075 0.019
effect (0.073) (0.079) (0.053) (0.096) (0.097) (0.070) (0.058) (0.061) (0.042)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203
Notes: "Control Mean" rows list averages and standard deviations of GPA, within the relevant gender-
year subgroup. "Treatment Effect" rows report coefficients from regressions of GPA on a treatment
dummy, with sampling strata controls (year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for
high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether
students answered questions on program rules correctly. GPA is on a four point scale. The sample used
for the full year estimates includes students with grades in fall and spring. The fall analysis omits full
year courses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. Effects on Components of the OK Scholarship Formula
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent
Control 4.58 5.22 4.85 5.18 5.01 5.11 4.75 5.16 4.92
mean [3.35] [2.84] [3.16] [3.17] [2.96] [3.08] [3.30] [2.87] [3.14]
Treatment -0.034 0.422 0.185 0.128 0.954 0.338 -0.010 0.572 0.239
effect (0.260) (0.335) (0.205) (0.356) (0.405)** (0.268) (0.208) (0.252)** (0.161)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203
Panel B. Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent
Control 38.9 43.3 40.8 45.5 45.0 45.3 40.9 43.8 42.1
mean [46.2] [42.1] [44.5] [47.4] [50.4] [48.5] [46.6] [44.4] [45.7]
Treatment -3.84 6.16 0.726 -0.290 7.98 1.05 -3.17 6.15 0.861
effect (3.76) (4.64) (2.88) (4.57) (5.49) (3.62) (2.87) (3.52)* (2.25)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the total number of courses in which the student received a
grade at 70 percent or higher over both semesters. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the sum of the
percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded 70 percent. "Control Mean" rows list
averages and standard deviations, within the relevant gender-year subgroup. "Treatment Effect" rows
report coefficients from regressions on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year
in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students'
first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program
rules correctly. Full year courses are double-weighted in the calculation of both dependent variables.
The sample used to make this table includes students with grades in fall and spring. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6. Full Year Effects (Students Who Calculated Awards Correctly)
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Hypothetical) Program -218 219 -9.32 102 370 160 -80.4 245 63.7
earnings (130)* (155) (101) (144) (172)** (111) (97.2) (114)** (74.8)
Average grades -1.23 0.999 -0.161 0.839 1.73 0.754 -0.351 1.03 0.219
(1.10) (1.12) (0.779) (1.51) (1.31) (1.00) (0.913) (0.879) (0.634)
GPA -0.107 0.112 -0.002 0.123 0.167 0.103 -0.008 0.117 0.044
(0.088) (0.095) (0.064) (0.118) (0.117) (0.083) (0.072) (0.074) (0.052)
Number of courses with -0.339 0.715 0.165 0.429 1.19 0.637 -0.008 0.813 0.353
grade of at least 70 percent (0.333) (0.410)* (0.264) (0.431) (0.497)** (0.323)** (0.265) (0.309) *** (0.203)*
Total grade percentage -9.21 7.38 -1.29 2.97 12.6 4.82 -3.98 8.19 1.42
points over 70 percent (5.25)* (5.98) (3.96) (5.37) (6.49)* (4.19) (3.81) (4.37)* (2.91)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1,203
Notes: "Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent" is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 70
percent or higher. "Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent" is the sum
70 percent. Each row reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated
of the percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded
variable on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls
(gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students'
parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are
calculation of the dependent variables. The sample used to make this table includes students with grades in fall and
errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
first language is English,
double-weighted in the
spring. Robust standard
56
Table 7. Effects in Fall 2009
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Hypothetical) Program 7.22 60.0 33.5 77.6 22.8 36.8 22.7 54.1 33.0
earnings (58.4) (68.7) (44.2) (73.2) (77.9) (52.7) (45.2) (51.4) (33.9)
Average grades 1.44 0.344 0.844 1.36 -2.16 -0.448 1.35 -0.618 0.299
(0.917) (1.17) (0.736) (1.49) (1.46) (1.06) (0.803)* (0.912) (0.603)
GPA 0.148 0.019 0.082 0.083 -0.144 -0.037 0.119 -0.041 0.033
(0.079)* (0.096) (0.062) (0.127) (0.122) (0.088) (0.068)* (0.074) (0.050)
Number of courses with 0.196 0.166 0.180 0.224 0.072 0.127 0.197 0.131 0.145
grade of at least 70 percent (0.163) (0.184) (0.121) (0.226) (0.230) (0.162) (0.132) (0.141) (0.096)
Total grade percentage -0.620 2.17 0.776 2.76 0.782 1.21 0.152 2.05 0.921
points over 70 percent (2.32) (2.69) (1.75) (2.74) (3.02) (1.99) (1.75) (2.02) (1.32)
N 395 334 729 209 165 374 604 499 1,103
Notes: "Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent" is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 70
percent or higher. "Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent" is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded
70 percent. Each row reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated variable on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls
(gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English,
parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are excluded from the calculation of
all five dependent variables. "First Year" and "Second Year" continue to refer to the students' standing during the program period. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8. IV Estimates for Participants - Panel A: Full Sample
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First stage (any contact)
Second stages:
(Hypothetical) Program
earnings
Average grades
GPA
Number of courses
with grade of at least
70 percent
Total grade percentage
points over 70 percent
N
0.901
(0.029)
-89.0
(104)
-0.359
(1.05)
-0.023
(0.079)
0.891
(0.032)
186
(131)
0.527
(1.02)
0.897
(0.022)
36.8
(81.3)
0.084
(0.727)
0.062 0.020
(0.086) (0.058)
-0.037 0.473 0.206
(0.283) (0.362) (0.225)
-4.27
(4.11)
441
6.92
(5.05)
339
0.809
(3.16)
780
0.844
(0.037)
8.31
(139)
-0.276
(1.38)
0.023
(0.110)
0.152
(0.407)
-0.344
(5.23)
242
0.874 0.858
(0.035)*** (0.025)***
292
(156)*
1.34
(1.18)
63.9
(108)
-0.171
(0.956)
(0.023)***
-73.4
(83.6)
-0.523
(0.840)
0.144 0.024 -0.022
(0.105) (0.080) (0.065)
1.09 0.394 -0.011
(0.437)** (0.304) (0.234)
9.14
(5.96)
181
1.22
(4.12)
423
-3.62
(3.24)
683
58
(0.024)***
204
(101)**
0.696
(0.795)
0.084
(0.068)
0.648
(0.277)**
6.97
(3.89)*
520
(0.017)***
46.8
(65.4)
-0.029
(0.587)
0.021
(0.047)
0.272
(0.180)
0.981
(2.53)
1,203
Table 8 (continued). IV Estimates for Participants - Panel B: Students Who Calculated Awards Correctly
Women Men All
First Second First Second First Second
Years Years All Years Years All Years Years All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First stage (any contact) 0.922 0.907 0.915 0.863 0.900 0.875 0.896 0.895 0.895
(0.033) *** (0.035) *** (0.024) *** (0.043) *** (0.037)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.019)***
Second stages:
(Hypothetical) Program -237 241 -10.2 119 411 183 -89.8 274 71.2
earnings (139)* (164) (108) (158) (178)** (123) (106) (123)** (82.0)
Average grades -1.34 1.10 -0.176 0.972 1.92 0.862 -0.392 1.15 0.245
(1.16) (1.19) (0.835) (1.66) (1.35) (1.10) (0.997) (0.950) (0.696)
GPA -0.116 0.123 -0.002 0.143 0.186 0.117 -0.008 0.130 0.049
(0.094) (0.101) (0.069) (0.129) (0.120) (0.091) (0.079) (0.080) (0.057)
Number of courses -0.368 0.788 0.181 0.497 1.32 0.729 -0.009 0.908 0.394
with grade of at least (0.353) (0.432)* (0.282) (0.475) (0.511)** (0.356)** (0.289) (0.332)*** (0.222)*
70 percent
Total grade percentage -9.99 8.13 -1.41 3.45 14.0 5.51 -4.44 9.15 1.59
points over 70 percent (5.58)* (6.34) (4.25) (5.91) (6.71)** (4.62) (4.16) (4.73)* (3.19)
N 274 236 510 166 127 293 440 163 803
Notes: "First Stage (Any Contact)" rows report coefficients from a regression of a dummy variable equal to one if the student made any program-
related contact (see Table 2) on a treatment dummy. "Second Stage" rows report coefficients from IV regressions, instrumenting for the
program contact dummy with the treatment dummy. All regressions include sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school
grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students
answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are double-weighted in the calculation of second stage dependent variables.
The sample used for this table includes students with grades in fall and spring. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 9. Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards
Effects
Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. Angrist, Lang, First year students at $1,000 for C+ to B- first First year GPA 0.010 -0.110 0.086
and Oreopoulos
(2009) [The
Student
Achievement
and Retention
Project]
Canadian commuter year performance, $5,000
university in 2005- for B+ to A performance
2006, except for top (varies by HS grade)
HS grade quartile
Incentives and support
services
First year credits earned
Second year GPA
Second year credits
earned
First year GPA
First year credits earned
Second year GPA
Second year credits
earned
(0.066)
[1.805]
-0.012
(0.064)
[2.3631
-0.018
(0.066)
[2.040]
0.027
(0.108)
[2.492]
0.210
(0.092)**
[1.805]
0.092
(0.087)
[2.363]
0.072
(0.091)
[2.040]
0.072
(0.130)
[2.492]
(0.103)
[1.908]
-0.157
(0.106)
[2.453]
-0.081
(0.108)
[2.084]
0.155
(0.180)
[2.468]
0.084
(0.162)
[1.908]
-0.196
(0.015)
[2.453]
-0.170
(0.161)
[2.084]
-0.240
(0.206)
[2.468]
(0.084)
[1.728]
0.084
(0.082)
[2.298]
0.030
(0.085)
[2.008]
-0.024
(0.137)
[2.509]
0.267
(0.117)**
[1.728]
0.269
(0.108)**
[2.298]
0.276
(0.106)***
[2.008]
0.280
(0.172)
[2.509]
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Table 9 (continued). Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards
Effects
Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2. Angrist, First year students Over two semesters and for First year GPA -0.019 0.019 -0.021
Oreopoulos, and
Williams (2013)
[Opportunity
Knocks]
3. Barrow et al.
(2010) [Opening
Doors Louisiana]
4. Cha and Patel
(2010) [Ohio
Performance-
Based Scholarship
Demonstration]
on financial aid at
Canadian commuter
university in 2008-
2009
Second year
students on
financial aid at
Canadian commuter
University in 2008-
2009
Low-income parents
beginning
community college
in Louisiana
between 2004 and
2005
Low-income Ohio
college students in
2008 with children
and eligible for
TANF
each semester-long course,
$100 for attaining at least 70
percent and $20 for each
percentage point higher than
this (full course load = 10
semester courses)
For each of two semesters,
$250 for at least half-time
enrollment, $250 for C average
or better at end of midterms,
and $500 for maintaining a C
average, plus optional
Enhanced college counseling
$1,800 for earning a grade of C
or better in 12 or more credits,
or $900 for a C or better in 6 to
11 credits, with payments at
end of each semester
GPA, fall term of
year after program
First year GPA
GPA, fall term of
year after program
First year GPA
First year credits
earned
Registered one year
after program year
First year credits
attempted
First year credits
earned
(0.058)
[2.42]
0.119
(0.068)*
[2.60]
0.075
(0.061)
[2.65]
-0.014
(0.026)
[2.83]
0.068
(0.104)
[2.171]
3.345
(0.849)***
[7.623]
0.053
(0.038)
0.5
(0.8)
[19.5]
2.0
(0.5)***
[13.41
(0.096)
[2.55]
0.083
(0.127)
[2.58]
0.126
(0.097)
[2.67]
-0.144
(0.122)
[2.79]
(0.073)
[2.37]
0.148
(0.079)*
[2.61]
0.055
(0.079)
[2.64]
0.019
(0.096)
[2.85]
sample is mostly
female
sample is mostly
female
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Table 9 (continued). Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards
Effects
Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
5. De Paola, First year business $1,000 for students with the 30 Cumulative exam 6.023 5.390 5.841
Scoppa, and
Nistico (2010)
6. Leuven,
Oosterbeek, and
van der Klaauw
(2010)
students at the
University of
Calabria in 2008-
2009
First year economics
and business
students at the
University of
Amsterdam in 2001-
2002
highest cumulative scores on
all exams
$350 for students with the 30
highest cumulative scores on
all exams
$600 for completion of all first
year requirements by start of
new academic year
$200 for completion of all first
year requirements by start of
new academic year
score
Credits earned
Cumulative exam
score
Credits earned
Met first year
requirements
Total "credit points"
in first three years
Met first year
requirements
Total "credit points"
in first three years
(3.059)**
2.335
(1.197)**
5.350
(3.164) *
2.194
(1.266) *
0.046
(0.065)
[0.195]
-1.2
(9.8)
[84.3]
0.007
(0.062)
[0.195]
-2.5
(9.6)
[84.3]
(4.615)
1.759
(1.854)
2.354
(4.877)
0.714
(1.970)
(4.061)
2.490
(1.518) *
6.157
(4.207)
2.766
(1.655) *
not reported
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Table 9 (continued). Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards
Effects
Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
7. Leuven et al.
(2011)
8. MacDonald et al.
(2009)
[Foundations
for Success]
9. Miller et al.
(2011) [New
Mexico
Performance-
Based Scholarship
Demonstration]
First year economics
and business
students at the
University of
Amsterdam in 2004-
2005 and 2005-2006
At-risk students
beginning
community college
in Ontario, Canada,
between 2007 and
2008
Low-income
students starting at
the University of
New Mexico in fall,
2008, and fall, 2009
$1,250 for the student with the
top microeconomics exam
score
$3,750 for the student with the
top microeconomics exam
score
$6,250 for the student with the
top microeconomics exam
score
$750 each of three semesters
for 1) obtaining 2.0 GPA or
higher, 2) eligible to continue
in a full program the following
semester, and 3) completing at
least 12 hours of tutorial, case
management, or career
workshops
$1,000 each of four semesters
for 1) obtaining 2.0 GPA or
higher, 2) enrolling full time,
and 3) completing two extra
advisor meetings per semester
Microeconomics
exam score
Microeconomics
exam score
Microeconomics
exam score
First semester GPA
during program
(missing imputed)
Second semester GPA
during program
(missing imputed)
Third semester GPA
during program
(missing imputed)
Registered in fourth
semester (after
program)
First semester credits
earned
Second semester
credits earned
0.974
(0.877)
[18.7]
1.184
(0.617)*
[18.9]
-0.629
(0.644)
[21.2]
0.08
p> 0 .1
[2.11]
0.12
p<0.05**
[1.88]
0.01
p>0.1
[2.01]
0.02
p>0. 1
[0.557]
0.0
(0.2)
[12.8]
0.6
(0.3)*
[11.1]
not reported
0.12
p>0.1
[2.20]
0.14
p<0.05**
not [2.04]
reported 0.12
p<0.05**
[2.16]
0.014
p>0.1
[0.58]
not reported
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Table 9 (continued). Randomized Evaluations of College Achievement Awards
Effects
Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
10. Richburg-Hayes New York City Up to $1,300 each of two or First semester credits 0.6
Sommo, and community college three semesters, paid in earned (0.3)*
Welbeck (2011) students aged 22-35 installments for achieving [8.1] not reported
[New York who required 1) registration, 2) continued Second semester 0.6
Performance- remediation fall, mid-semester enrollment, and credits earned (0.4)
Based Scholarship 2008, through fall, 3) 2.0 GPA in at least six credits [9.3]
Demonstration] 2009
Notes: The table reports main baseline sample outcomes for grades, credits earned, and measures of persistence. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. Control means are shown in square brackets. See text for sources and more details
* significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. *** significant at 1% level
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Table 10. Quasi-Randomized Evaluations of Merit-Based College Scholarships
Study Treatment Methodology Outcome Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Castleman (2013)
[Bright Futures
Scholarship,
Florida Medallion
Scholars (FMS)
and Florida
Academic
Scholars (FAS)]
2. Cohodes and
Goodman (2013)
[John and Abigail
Adams
Scholarship
Program (MA)]
3. Cornwell, Lee,
Mustard (2005)
[Georgia HOPE]
4. Dynarski (2008)
[Georgia HOPE
and Arkansas
merit aid
program]
FMS: 75 percent of public college tuition
and fees for students with a 3.0 high school
GPA and at least 20 on the ACT or 970 on
the SAT
FAS: 100 percent of public college tuition
and fees for students with a 3.5 high school
GPA and at least 28 on the ACT or 1270 on
the SAT
MA public school tuition waived (excluding
substantial fees) for students who score in the
top 25th percentile of their school district and
attain minimum absolute benchmarks on the
statewide tenth grade test; must maintain 3.0
GPA in college
Full tuition/fees at GA public colleges for
students with a 3.0 high school GPA; must
maintain 3.0 GPA in college
$1,000 at inception (now $2,500) for tuition/
fees at AR colleges for students with at least
19 on the ACT and a 2.5 core high school
GPA; full tuition/fees at GA public colleges
for students with a 3.0 high school GPA; for
AR and GA, must maintain 3.0 GPA in
college
Difference in
differences, non-
eligible students as
controls
Difference in
differences, non-
FMS students as
controls
Regression
discontinuity on
tenth grade test
score
Differences in
differences, non-
GA-resident students
as controls
Difference in
differences, other
state populations as
controls
FL public college credits, four
years
FL public college BA in four
years
FL public college credits, four
years
FL public college BA in four
years
Enrolled on time at a four-
year college
Graduated in four years from
a four-year college
Enrolled in full freshman
course load at University of
Georgia
Completed full freshman
course load at University of
Georgia
Fraction of age 22-34
population with a college
degree
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-0.634
(1.844)
0.011
(0.019)
8.466
(1.744)***
0.058
(0.021)***
0.018
(0.005)***
[0.710]
-0.017
(0.004)***
[0.418]
-0.042
(0.016)***
[0.812]
-0.060
(0.019)***
[0.588]
0.0298
(0.004)***
[0.337]
Table 10. Quasi-Randomized Evaluations of Merit-Based College Scholarships
Study Treatment Methodology Outcome Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5. Scott-Clayton Full tuition/fees at WV public colleges for Regression Cumulative four-year GPA 0.099
(2011) [West students with a 3.0 overall and core high discontinuity on for WV public college students (0.045)**
Virginia school GPA and at least 21 on the ACT or ACT score Earned BA in four years 0.094
PROMISE] 1000 on the SAT (0.022)**
Event study, program Cumulative four-year GPA 0.039
introduction (small for WV public college students (0.018)
sample T-distribution Earned BA in four years 0.067
critical values) (0.005)***
6. Sjoquist and $1,000 at inception (now $2,500) for tuition/ Difference in Fraction of age 22-34 0.0091
Winters (2012a) fees at AR colleges for students with at least differences, other population with a college p=0.216
[Georgia HOPE 19 on the ACT and a 2.5 core high school state populations as degree [0.3567]
and Arkansas GPA; full tuition/fees at GA public colleges controls; increased
merit aid for students with a 3.0 high school GPA; for sample and updated
program] AR and GA, must maintain 3.0 GPA in clustering compared
College with Dynarski (2008)
7. Sjoquist and 25 state merit aid programs with requirements Difference in Fraction of age 24-30 0.0009
Winters (2012a) on high school GPA, ACT/SAT scores, and differences, non- population with a college (0.0031)
college credit enrollment and GPA merit state degree [0.388]
Nine strongest state merit aid programs with populations as Fraction of age 24-30 0.0011
requirements on high school GPA, ACT/SAT controls population with a college (0.0037)
scores, and college credit enrollment and GPA degree [0.388]
Notes: The table reports main baseline sample outcomes for grades and measures of persistence. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Control means are shown in square brackets. See text for sources and more details.
* significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. *** significant at 1% level
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Figure 1. Densities of Full Year (Hypothetical) Earnings
First Year Women Second Year Women
0.00050 -
-0.00025 -
n n00n0
0 1000
KS test p-value: 0.348
2000 3000
Earnings (CAD)
4000 5000
0.00050 -
0.00025
0.00000
KS test p- ialue:
1000 2000 3000
Earnings (CAD)
4000 5000
First Year Men Second Year Men
0.00050 -
- 0.00025
0.00000 -
0
KS test p-valu
1000
0.773
2000
Earnings
3000
(CAD)
0
4000 5000
- -Treatment
0.00050
0.00025 -
A AAAAA
0 1000
KS test p-value: 0.108
- Control
2000 3000
Earnings (CAD)
4000 5000
Note: The figure plots the smoothed kernel densities of OK program earnings for the full year from fall 2008 through spring 2009. Control
earnings are hypothetical; treated earnings are actual. Full-year courses are double-weighted in the earnings calculation. The sample used to
make this figure includes students with grades in fall and spring.
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e:
Figure 2. Full Year Effects on Number of Courses over Grade Thresholds
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Note: The figure shows treatment effects on the number of courses in which students earned a grade at or above a given threshold, where the
thresholds are plotted on the x-axis. Control densities are kernel density plots of grades at the course level using a normal kernel, taking only
grades between 60 and 80 percent (inclusive). Treatment effects were estimated using the same models as for Table 3.
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Chapter 3
To Tank or Not to Tank? Evidence from the National Basketball Association
with
Christopher Walters
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
High draft picks are a coveted commodity in the NBA. Teams are often accused of losing intentionally
("tanking") in order to increase their odds of receiving a favorable pick in the league's draft lottery. This
paper answers two questions related to tanking in the NBA: (1) What is the value of receiving the first
draft pick?, and (2) Do teams lose intentionally to secure higher draft positions? We answer the first
question by adjusting for the probability of winning the lottery using a propensity score methodology.
The estimates indicate that winning the draft lottery increases attendance by 6 percentage points during
the five-year period following the draft. Receiving the first pick is also associated with a small increase in
win percentage, though this effect is less precisely estimated. To answer the second question, we
analyze games played by non-playoff teams near the end of the season. Using a fixed-effects
methodology that compares games in which a team can potentially change its lottery odds to games at
the end of the season in which these odds are fixed, we find evidence of tanking. Since 1968, playoff-
eliminated teams have seen around a 5 percentage point increase in win percentage once their lottery
odds are fixed. This difference has ballooned above 10 percentage points in more recent years.
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I. Introduction
In the National Basketball Association (NBA), the selection order in the annual amateur draft is
determined via lottery. Weaker teams receive more weight in the lottery, but all non-playoff teams have
at least some chance to receive the first overall pick. Draft picks are a coveted commodity in NBA front
offices, and NBA teams are sometimes accused of "tanking" (that is, intentionally losing games) late in
the season in order to increase their chances in the lottery. In an April 2007 article titled "Tanks for
Nothing, NBA," ESPN's Bill Simmons chronicles a late-season game between the Milwaukee Bucks and
the Boston Celtics and argues that both teams were "desperate . . . to blow the game for lottery
position." The resulting game was a "stink bomb" in which "every paying customer lost" (Simmons,
2007).
This paper explores two questions related to tanking in the NBA. First, we ask whether receiving
a high draft pick actually has economic and competitive value. Despite the perceived benefits of a
favorable lottery position, there is substantial uncertainty associated with the performance of top
amateur prospects. Table 1 summarizes the careers of the players selected with the first overall pick in
the NBA drafts held from 1985 to 2010. Some first picks, like Tim Duncan and Shaquille O'Neal, became
superstars and won multiple league championships; others, like Michael Olowokandi and Kwame Brown,
failed to qualify for a single NBA all-star team. Since the NBA's rookie salary scale requires teams to
make significant financial commitments to high draft picks regardless of their performance, the true
value of owning a high draft pick is theoretically unclear.
The first step of our analysis uses propensity score re-weighting to estimate the causal effects of
winning the NBA draft lottery. Since bad teams are more likely to win the lottery, simple comparisons of
subsequent outcomes for winners and losers would not capture true causal effects. However, the draft
lottery setting is favorable, because the probability of winning the lottery for each team (the propensity
score) is known ex ante. After adjusting for this known probability of assignment, the lottery outcome is
random, and comparisons of winners and losers are unbiased. Our estimates are based on two
weighting schemes that capture causal effects for different segments of the population. First, we weight
observations to reflect the distribution of characteristics among lottery winners, so as to estimate the
effect of treatment on the treated (TOT). Second, we weight observations to match the full population
of teams, so as to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE). We use this methodology to estimate
the effect of receiving the first pick on attendance and win percentage. The results indicate that
receiving the first pick leads to a TOT attendance increase of about 6 percent in the five years following
the lottery and a similar but shorter-lived ATE, although the ATE is less precisely estimated.
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Our second question is whether teams recognize these benefits and tank to increase their odds
of receiving a high draft pick. To answer this question, we focus on the performance of non-playoff
teams near the end of the season. We use a fixed-effects methodology that compares games in which a
team's lottery odds are already determined to games in which these odds would be improved by a loss.
The results show that teams do tank in order to improve their draft prospects. Between 1968 and 2009,
playoff-eliminated teams were around 5 percentage points more likely to win when doing so could not
hurt their draft position. This effect is primarily driven by recent behavior; since 1989, win percentage
for teams whose lottery odds are fixed is over 10 percentage points higher.
In a related study, Price et al. (2010) study tanking in the NBA. They argue that receiving a high
draft pick increases gate revenue, and that teams tank to improve draft position. Our paper improves
and extends their study in several important ways. First, their analysis of the value of the first pick does
not account for unobservable differences between lottery winners and losers, and is therefore
contaminated by selection bias. We solve this problem by explicitly adjusting for the probability of
winning the lottery, thus eliminating this bias. Second, their methodology for identifying tanking is based
on comparisons between playoff and non-playoff teams; there may be underlying differences in team
quality that drive the results of such comparisons. We use a richer methodology that holds team quality
fixed by comparing games in which the incentive to tank is turned on or off for a given non-playoff team
in a particular season. Our approach isolates the tanking incentive and yields uniquely credible evidence
of tanking in the NBA.
II. The Value of the First Pick
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the economic and competitive effects of receiving
the first pick in the NBA draft. This analysis is complicated by the potential for selection bias: Since
teams with poor records receive disproportionate weight in the lottery's selection mechanism, lottery
winners are likely to continue to perform poorly relative to lottery losers in future seasons regardless of
whether they win the lottery. However, a useful feature of the NBA lottery context is that the weight
determining each team's probability of winning can be directly calculated. In the language of
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score (probability of winning) is known. With appropriate
re-weighting using this probability, the lottery is purely random. We utilize this insight to estimate the
effects of winning the lottery using two weighting schemes (see, for example, Kline, 2011, for a
derivation of these weights):
TOT weights: 1 for lottery winners, Pit 1 for lottery losers,1-pit 7T
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IT 1-It
ATE weights: -for lottery winners, - for lottery losers,Pit 1-pit
where Pit is the known lottery odds for lottery team i in year t, and r is the fraction of lottery winners in
the sample. Our estimating equation for analyzing the value of the first pick is then
Yit = a + ftFit + Eit,
weighted by either the TOT or ATE weights, where Yit is an outcome of interest for team i in year t (for
example, attendance or win percentage in a subsequent year), and Fit is an indicator variable for
receiving the first pick. Our coefficient of interest is fl, which captures the causal effect of winning the
first pick. We estimate equation (1) using data on participants in the 25 NBA draft lotteries held from
1985 to 2009, excluding teams that traded their picks prior to the lottery drawing. Outcomes are taken
30from the 1986 to 2010 NBA seasons.
Following Florke and Ecker (2003), Pit is calculated using standard rules of probability along with
a historical database of NBA lottery rules. We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and cluster
them at the franchise level due to the potential for correlation within a franchise over time. Before
discussing our results, we perform a simple balance check to verify that weighting by the TOT or ATE
weights eliminates observable differences between lottery winners and losers. Table 2 displays the
relationship between pre-lottery team characteristics and receipt of the first pick. Column (1) shows
coefficients from regressions of a variety of team attributes on a dummy for winning the lottery. While
assignment of the first pick is not significantly related to previous win percentage, points per game, or
all-star appearances, it is strongly negatively correlated with the previous season's attendance and
scoring differential. Teams that win the first pick have average attendance 6 points lower than other
lottery teams, and score 1.7 fewer points per game relative to their opponents. This means that
regressions using a simple dummy variable for winning the lottery will give biased estimates; lottery
winners are systematically different than lottery losers, due to the weighting in the lottery odds.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 illustrate that weighting by the probability of winning the lottery
successfully adjusts for these differences between winners and losers. The reported coefficients are
estimates from versions of equation (1) using each pre-lottery characteristic as the dependent variable.
Notably, the coefficients on the first pick dummy in the equations for win percentage and scoring
differential are no longer statistically significant, and the estimates are close to zero in most cases. Since
the ATE is the average causal effect across all lottery teams and teams with low lottery odds rarely win
30 NBA lottery rules are available at http://www.nba.com/history/lottery probabilities.html. Team records and other
characteristics are available at http://basketballreference.com/stats download.htm. Attendance information is
available at http://www.apbr.org/attendance.html and http://espn.go.com/nba/attendance.
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the lottery, estimates with these weights tend to have larger standard errors. The first pick coefficients
in the regressions for other team characteristics remain insignificant. Weighting by the probability of
winning the lottery as described above is sufficient to erase observable differences between lottery
winners and losers. This lends credibility to our use of propensity score re-weighting to estimate the
causal effects of winning the lottery.
We now turn to our causal estimates. Table 3 reports OLS estimates from equation (1) using the
natural log of attendance and win percentage as dependent variables and TOT and ATE weights.
Columns (1) and (2) show results for attendance for years 1 through 5 after the lottery and total log
attendance over these years. The estimates show attendance gains close to 6 percent in most years
following a lottery win for the treated sample, significant at the 10-percent level or lower in all years.
Average effects for the whole sample of lottery teams are similar in years 1, 2, and 3 (though less
precise) and fade in years 4 and 5. Given that the worst teams are overrepresented in the lottery sample
and have farther to go to reach their attendance ceiling, higher persistence for the TOT is not surprising.
Overall, winning the draft lottery appears to substantially increase attendance in the short term.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 repeat the analysis for the TOT and ATE, respectively, with team
win percentage as the dependent variable. The results show that winning the draft lottery weakly
increases subsequent win percentage for lottery winners, with the gain peaking at 8 to 9 percentage
points in the 4th year after the lottery. The 4th-year TOT estimates are highly statistically significant.
Though the TOT estimates for other years are small and not significantly different from zero, all of them
are positive. The ATE results are somewhat stronger. Win percentage increases by between 6 and 9
percentage points in years 1 through 4, statistically significant in all years except year 3. Columns (5) and
(6) show similar results for win percentage, strongest in year 4. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that winning the lottery leads to small increases in win percentage over the next few years.
The last two columns of Table 3 show the TOT and ATE on the number of All-Star selections,
which designate the top players in the NBA each season. The results are broadly consistent with the
effects on win percentage. Four years after winning the lottery, treated teams average nearly 0.5
additional All-Stars (significant at the 5 percent level). The ATE is slightly smaller, around 0.4 additional
All-Stars. Even in year one, the TOT for All-Stars is around 0.3 and significant at the 10 percent level,
though the ATE is not significant in earlier years.
3 Estimates beyond year five (not reported) are not reliable since the sample size shrinks as teams are followed for
additional years.
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11l. Do NBA Teams Tank?
The results in Table 3 show that winning a high draft pick yields economic and competitive
benefits. Do teams tank to increase their chances of receiving these benefits? To answer this question,
we analyze the relationship between game outcomes and the incentive to tank for teams eliminated
from the playoffs from 1968 to 2009. Our preferred estimating equation in this context is
Whatgf = Kht + Aat + Pg + Vf + OhChtg + aCatf + YhEhtg + YaEatf + 7lhatgf, (2)
where each game is a unique observation, Whatgf is a dummy variable equal to one if home team h
wins against away team a in year t with g games remaining for the home team and f games remaining
for the away team, Kht and 'at are full sets of home and away team-by-season fixed effects,
respectively, [g and vf are sets of fixed effects for the number of games remaining in the season for the
home and away team, respectively, Chtg and Catf are dummy variables equal to one if home team h and
away team a are eliminated from the playoffs and can no longer change their lottery odds with g and f
games remaining in year t, and Ehtg and Eatf are dummy variables equal to one if the home and away
team are eliminated from the playoffs. In years 1968 to 1983 and 1989 to 2009, Chtg and Catf equal one
if team h and team a, respectively, have clinched their final rank, so that they can no longer pass or be
passed by another team. In years 1984 to 1988, all lottery-eligible teams faced even odds in the lottery,
and so the clinching dummies are always one for playoff-eliminated teams in these years. Thus, in
games where the clinching dummies are one, the teams have no incentive to tank for draft position,
while when these dummies are zero, the teams have an incentive to tank.
The game fixed effects control for changes in teams' performance over the course of a season
that are not due to tanking. For example, it is possible that all playoff-eliminated teams put in less effort
as the season winds down, regardless of their tanking incentive. The team-season effects control for
team quality in a particular season for a given team. The coefficients of interest, 6,4 and Oa, capture the
effect of having an incentive to tank on team performance. We perform the analysis at the level of a
game rather than at the level of each team in the game to avoid mechanical correlation between two
observations from the same game. Standard errors for equation (2) are clustered at the home team-
season level.
Tables 4 and 5 show the clinching progression for draft lottery ranking over the last five days of
the 2007 and 2008 seasons. The cells with grey shading in each table represent days where the team
with the given lottery rank had clinched its rank, setting its clinching dummy equal to one. In both
tables, most teams did not clinch their spot before the end of the season. Based on the number of
games remaining and the win totals for them and the nearest teams in the rankings, it was possible for
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their rank to change until the final day. However, three teams in 2007 and two teams in 2008 clinched
their ranking before the final game. These teams had no explicit incentive to lose in the games played on
the grey-shaded days. 2
Our estimation strategy amounts to a difference in differences procedure, where the first
difference is over time within teams (before and after clinching for teams that clinch) and the second
difference is between teams. Before presenting estimates of tanking behavior in the NBA, we perform a
standard check to determine whether clinching teams and non-clinching teams were on similar trends
before the clinching teams locked in their ranking. To do this, in Table 6, we drop the games where Chtg
equals one and recode Chtg equal to one in the two games prior to the actual clinching game. In other
words, we test for treatment effects on the home team in the two games prior to clinching, when no
treatment was actually present. Table 7 repeats the analysis for away teams.3 3
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show pre-treatment estimates for home team win percentage,
controlling for team-season and games-remaining fixed effects. Since the number of games remaining in
the season for the home and away team entering a given game are highly correlated, we estimate
regressions in column (1) using fixed effects for the home team's games remaining only, though this
restriction has little effect on the point estimates and significance levels in this and future tables. Both
columns show that win percentage for clinching home teams is about 7.5 percentage points worse in
the two games preceding the clinching game (marginally significant at the 10 percent level). This result is
problematic for our identification strategy, since it suggests that clinching home teams were on a
downward trend relative to non-clinching teams prior to the clinching game.
We continue with the difference in differences strategy for three reasons. First, the same
specification with point differential (home score minus away score) as the dependent variable shows no
significant difference in trends for clinching and non-clinching home teams in columns (3) and (4). Point
differential is a continuous outcome that may reflect team quality more accurately in small samples than
win percentage, which is a discontinuous function of the point differential in each game. Second, the
negative pre-trend for clinching teams may in fact reflect tanking behavior. Teams that clinch may do so
by tanking more effectively than those who do not. If clinching teams tank more, our estimates will still
reflect tanking behavior in general. Third, Table 7 shifts the focus to the away team, and all effects are
32 In the event of a tie, the teams each receive the average of the odds for the two relevant ranks, so teams have an
incentive to lose until ties are no longer possible.
3 We maintain the actual treatment status for the opposing team in each table, so that the regression controls for the
incentives of the opposing team properly.
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far from statistical significance (though these tests are not very high powered). Still, we will keep the
pre-trends in mind when interpreting results from the main specification.
Table 8 has the same structure as Tables 6 and 7, with Cftg and Catf representing actual
treatment instead of pre-treatment. The coefficients therefore estimate tanking behavior, under the
assumptions of the difference in differences model. Columns (1) and (2) show that home team win
percentage increases by about 6 percentage points when the home team has clinched (marginally
statistically significant depending on the fixed effects specification), and decreases by about 5
percentage points when the away team has clinched (also significant at the 10 percent level). These
nearly equal and opposite changes in home team win percentage are consistent with the hypothesis
that team performance improves after clinching. We control for the playoff elimination status of each
team in the regression as well, since eliminated teams may have a lower incentive to win. However, the
point estimates for playoff elimination are not statistically significant and close to zero in all regressions,
likely because most teams realize they will not make the playoffs long before they are officially
eliminated.
Despite the consistent results on win percentage, the pre-treatment analysis above suggests
that some of the difference is due to clinching home teams' declining win percentage before clinching.
We turn to point differential to reduce these concerns somewhat. Columns (3) and (4) show similar
effects on point differential, especially in response to the away team clinching. The home team loses
more than 2 points of point differential over the away team once the away team has clinched
(significant at the 1 percent level). While the point estimate for the home team's clinch effect is positive
at nearly 1.5 points, the standard errors are slightly bigger and the effect is not statistically significant.
In Table 9, we explore whether tanking has increased or decreased over time. The regression
specification is identical to the model employed in Table 8, but limited to the period before 1984 in the
top panel and the period after 1988 in the top panel. We omit the seasons from 1984 to 1988, since
lottery odds were the same for all playoff-eliminated teams in those years and therefore there was no
incentive to tank in any games. The estimates in Table 8 suggest that tanking has increased substantially.
In fact, while the point estimates for point differential in columns (3) and (4) have the expected sign
before 1984, they are far from statistical significance. The point estimates for win percentage show no
evidence of tanking either. The point estimates after 1988 suggest substantial tanking. Home team win
percentage increases around 15 percentage points after the home team clinches and drops about 10
percentage points after the away team clinches (significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively).
The effects on point differential mirror these effects, though significance levels are lower for the home-
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team clinch effect. Taken together, the results from before 1984 and after 1988 suggest that tanking is a
relatively new phenomenon in the NBA.
IV. Conclusions
High picks in the NBA draft are perceived to benefit teams both competitively and financially. As
a result, lottery-eligible teams have an incentive to tank at the end of the season in order to improve
their chances of getting a high pick. This paper provides two new pieces of evidence on tanking in the
NBA. First, weighting by the probability of winning the lottery to eliminate selection bias, we show that
landing the first pick in the draft lottery increases attendance by about 6 percent over each of the
subsequent five years for the treated sample (TOT) from 1989 to 2010. The average effect for all lottery-
eligible teams (ATE) is similar but somewhat shorter lived. Winning the lottery also increases win
percentage in the short run for treated teams, with the impact peaking at 8 to 9 percent in the 4th year
following the lottery. The ATE on win percentage is more immediate and consistent. Overall, these
results show that the first pick is competitively and economically valuable.
Second, we have uncovered new evidence that commentators and fans are right to blame teams
for tanking. Among playoff-eliminated teams, those whose final rank is in doubt have worse
performance. For the whole sample of teams, the probability of winning a home game increases by
around 6 percentage points in response to the home team clinching its rank and decreases around 5
percentage points in response to the away team clinching. This difference is primarily driven by behavior
since 1988. Our tanking estimates in that period balloon to 15 percentage points and -10 percentage
points in response to the home and away team clinching, respectively. Point differential estimates are
similar: home teams perform around 3 points better after clinching, while away teams perform almost 5
points better after clinching. Differential pre-trends for clinching versus non-clinching home team win
percentage may muddy these results. However, given the consistency of our findings for point
differential and for the away team, we believe our results are an improvement on past attempts to
measure tanking. Importantly, our measurement of tanking is only a lower bound, since teams may
make commitments to tanking that they cannot change upon clinching their lottery rank (for example,
trading a star player or announcing that a player's season is over due to a mild injury). Other teams may
struggle to improve their play after playing poorly for a long stretch of time.
Whether tanking is the right choice for teams remains an open question. Although we have
measured clear economic benefits to tanking, our approach does not allow us to estimate lost revenue
from this behavior due to decreased attendance in the long or short run. Similarly, we cannot comment
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on whether players, coaches, or management are responsible for tanking behavior, or whether tanking
is bad for the NBA. The current draft order rules are meant to distribute new talent to the worst teams
in the league, so as to increase parity between teams. Incentives to tank are a necessary part of any
talent redistribution. If redistribution is valuable for the league, then there is a tradeoff between tanking
and increased parity that the league must balance. This paper documents that the balance is nontrivial:
measurable redistribution and tanking do occur under the current draft order rules.
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Table 1: First Picks in the NBA Draft, 1985-20 10
Notes: This table lists players selected with the first pick in the NBA
list initial tenure with the selecting team, All-star appearances, and
2010-2011 NBA season.
draft from 1985-2010. Columns (4)-(6)
NBA championships won through the
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Lottery year
(1)
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
First Pick
(2)
Patrick Ewing
Brad Daugherty
David Robinson
Danny Manning
Pervis Ellison
Derrick Coleman
Larry Johnson
Shaquille O'Neal
Chris Webber
Glenn Robinson
Joe Smith
Allen Iverson
Tim Duncan
Michael Olowokandi
Elton Brand
Kenyon Martin
Kwame Brown
Yao Ming
LeBron James
Dwight Howard
Andrew Bogut
Andrea Bargnani
Greg Oden
Derrick Rose
Blake Griffin
John Wall
Selecting team
(3)
New York Knicks
Cleveland Cavaliers
San Antonio Spurs
Los Angeles Clippers
Sacramento Kings
New Jersey Nets
Charlotte Hornets
Orlando Magic
Orlando Magic
Milwaukee Bucks
Golden State Warriors
Philadelphia 76ers
San Antonio Spurs
Los Angeles Clippers
Chicago Bulls
New Jersey Nets
Washington Wizards
Houston Rockets
Cleveland Cavaliers
Orlando Magic
Milwaukee Bucks
Toronto Raptors
Portland Trailblazers
Chicago Bulls
Los Angeles Clippers
Washington Wizards
Tenure with
selecting team
(4)
15
8
16
5
1
5
5
4
0
8
2
10
14
5
2
4
4
8
7
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
All-star
appearances
(5)
11
5
10
2
0
1
2
15
5
2
0
11
13
0
2
1
0
8
7
5
0
0
0
2
1
0
NBA
Championship
(6)
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
4
0
1
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Log attendance
Table 2: Covariate Balance
Unweighted TOT weights
(1) (2)
-0.060*** 0.012
(0.015) (0.016)
ATE weights
(3)
0.020
(0.029)
Scoring differential
Win percentage
Points per game
Number of all-stars
p-value from F-test
N
-1.660***
(0.567)
-0.048
(0.049)
-0.687
(0.883)
0.033
(0.111)
0.001
0.392
(0.581)
0.015
(0.044)
-0.511
(0.872)
0.158
(0.108)
0.515
234
1.005
(1.011)
0.058
(0.068)
0.976
(1.457)
0.104
(0.173)
0.162
Notes: This table shows coefficients from regressions of the pre-lottery
variable in each row on a dummy for winning the draft lottery. Column (1)
shows unweighted estimates. Column (2) uses weights equal to one for lottery
winners and (P/(l-P))*((-)/1x) for lottery losers, where P is the propensity
score and 7c is the fraction of teams winning the lottery. Column (3) uses
weights equal to 7/P for winners and (1 -7t)/(1-P) for losers. Standard errors,
clustered at the franchise level, are in parentheses. F-tests are for the
hypothesis that receiving the first pick is unrelated to any of the displayed
characteristics.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%
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Table 3: Effects of Winning the NBA Draft Lottery on Attendance, Win Percentage, and All-Star Appearances
Dep. var: Log attendance Dep. var: Win percentage Dep. var: Scoring differential Dep. var: Number of All-Stars
TOT weights ATE weights TOT weights ATE weights TOT weights ATE weights TOT weights ATE weights
Time period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
After 1 year 0.066* 0.084 0.032 0.066* 0.268* 0.216 0.268* 0.216
(0.038) (0.058) (0.029) (0.037) (0.153) (0.182) (0.153) (0.182)
N 234 234 234 234
After 2 years 0.061** 0.084* 0.023 0.087* 0.158 0.335 0.158 0.335
(0.030) (0.049) (0.034) (0.047) (0.145) (0.316) (0.145) (0.316)
N 221 221 221 221
After 3 years 0.052* 0.049* 0.033 0.089 0.103 0.345 0.103 0.345
(0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.058) (0.204) (0.346) (0.204) (0.346)
N 207 207 207 207
After 4 years 0.066** 0.033 0.087*** 0.062** 0.459** 0.382* 0.459** 0.382*
(0.028) (0.023) (0.032) (0.026) (0.226) (0.213) (0.226) (0.213)
N 195
After 5 years 0.064** 0.025 0.047 0.033 0.254 0.186 0.254 0.186
(0.032) (0.026) (0.035) (0.022) (0.199) (0.156) (0.199) (0.156)
N 182 182 182 182
Total, next 5 years 0.052** 0.021 0.043 0.067* 0.266* 0.373* 1.328* 1.865*
(0.023) (0.021) (0.029) (0.040) (0.137) (0.198) (0.683) (0.991)
N 182 182 182 182
Notes: This table shows regressions of subsequent log attendance, winning percentage, and All-Star appearances on a dummy for winning the NBA draft
lottery. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) estimate the effect of treatment on the treated (TOT) by using weights equal to one for lottery winners and (P/(1-P))*((1-
7t)/r) for lottery losers, where P is the propensity score and a is the fraction of teams winning the lottery. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) estimate the average
treatment effect (ATE) by using weights equal to i/P for winners and (1-n)/(I-P) for losers. Standard errors, clustered at the franchise level, are in
parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4. Clinching Progression Over the Last Five Days of the 2007 Season
Days Left
Lotto 5 4 3 2 1
Rank Wins Games Left Wins Games Left Wins Games Left Wins Games Left Wins Games Left
1 14 3 14 3 14 2 14 1 14 1
2 18 2 18 2 19 1 19 1 19 1
3 20 3 21 2 21 2 21 2 21 1
4 22 3 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 1
5 23 3 23 2 23 2 23 2 23 1
6 23 2 23 2 23 2 23 1 23 1
7 26 3 26 2 26 2 26 1 26 1
8 30 3 31 3 31 2 31 2 31 1
9 31 3 31 2 31 2 32 1 32 1
10 32 3 33 2 33 2 33 2 34 1
Note: Shaded columns indicate that the team with the corresponding rank in the left-most column had clinched their lottery rank at that
point in the season.
Table 5. Clinching Progression Over the Last Five Days of the 2008 Season
Days Left
Lotto 5 4 3 2 1
Rank Wins Games Left Wins Games Left Wins Games Left Wins Games Left Wins Games Left
1 16 3 16 3 16 2 16 1 16 1
2 19 2 19 2 19 2 19 1 19 1
3 19 3 19 2 19 2 19 1 19 1
4 22 3 22 2 22 2 22 1 22 1
5 23 3 23 3 23 2 23 1 23 1
6 24 3 24 2 24 2 24 1 24 1
7 28 3 29 2 29 2 29 1 29 1
8 30 3 30 3 31 2 31 1 31 1
9 31 2 31 2 31 1 32 1 32 1
10 32 3 33 2 33 2 34 1 34 1
Note: Shaded columns indicate that the team with the corresponding rank in the left-most column had clinched their lottery rank at that
point in the season.
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Table 6. Pretrend Test for Home Teams Within Three Games of Clinching Draft Odds
Dep. Var: Home Win Percentage Dep. Var: Home Point Differential
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-Treatment (Home) -0.074 -0.077 -0.957 -0.931
(0.042)* (0.041)* (1.150) (1.147)
Clinched (Away) -0.047 -0.047 -2.722 -2.759
(0.028)* (0.028)* (0.925)*** (0.926)***
Playoff Eliminated (Home) -0.002 -0.001 -0.287 -0.261
(0.016) (0.016) (0.409) (0.410)
Playoff Eliminated (Away) -0.011 -0.012 -0.251 -0.273
(0.012) (0.012) (0.350) (0.352)
N 38,061
Games Left Controls Home FEs Home & Away FEs Home FEs Home & Away FEs
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of a dummy for a home team win (columns 1 and 2) and the
home team score minus the away team score (columns 3 and 4) on a pre-treatment dummy equal to one if the home team
clinched its draft odds within two games of the current game, a treatment dummy equal to one if the away team had already
clinched its draft odds, and dummies for whether each team had been eliminated from the playoffs. The "Games Left
Controls" row notes the controls included for the number of games remaining in the season (fixed effects for just the home
team or for both teams). All regressions include home team by season and away team by season fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the team-season level are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Pretrend Test for Away Teams Within Three Games of Clinching Draft Odds
Dep. Var: Home Win Percentage Dep. Var: Home Point Differential
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clinched (Home) 0.055 0.050 1.015 0.912
(0.038) (0.038) (0.980) (0.987)
Pre-Treatment (Away) -0.040 -0.034 -0.303 -0.096
(0.044) (0.044) (1.208) (1.212)
Playoff Eliminated (Home) -0.004 -0.004 -0.257 -0.236
(0.015) (0.015) (0.410) (0.410)
Playoff Eliminated (Away) -0.010 -0.011 -0.275 -0.311
(0.013) (0.013) (0.352) (0.354)
N 38,126
Games Left Controls Home FEs Home & Away FEs Home FEs Home & Away FEs
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of a dummy for a home team win (columns 1 and 2) and the
home team score minus the away team score (columns 3 and 4) on a pre-treatment dummy equal to one if the away team
clinched its draft odds within two games of the current game, a treatment dummy equal to one if the home team had
already clinched its draft odds, and dummies for whether each team had been eliminated from the playoffs. The "Games
Left Controls" row notes the controls included for the number of games remaining in the season (fixed effects for just the
home team or for both teams). All regressions include home team by season and away team by season fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the team-season level are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * ** significant at 1%
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Table 8. Effect of Clinching Draft Odds on Performance for Playoff-Eliminated Teams
Dep. Var: Home Win Percentage Dep. Var: Home Point Differential
(1) (2) (3)
Clinched (Home) 0.062 0.058 1.489 1.368
(0.035)* (0.035) (0.932) (0.939)
Clinched (Away) -0.048 -0.047 -2.307 -2.323
(0.027)* (0.027)* (0.854)*** (0.855)***
Playoff Eliminated (Home) -0.004 -0.004 -0.265 -0.236
(0.015) (0.015) (0.398) (0.398)
Playoff Eliminated (Away) -0.008 -0.010 -0.181 -0.199
(0.012) (0.012) (0.342) (0.344)
N 40,083
Games Left Controls Home FEs Home & Away FEs Home FEs Home & Away FEs
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of a dummy for a home team win (columns I and 2) and the
home team score minus the away team score (columns 3 and 4) on treatment dummies for whether the home and away
team had clinched their draft odds and dummies for whether each team had been eliminated from the playoffs. The
"Games Left Controls" row notes the controls included for the number of games remaining in the season (fixed effects
for just the home team or for both teams). All regressions include home team by season and away team by season fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at the team-season level are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9. Effect of Clinching Draft Odds on Performance for Playoff-Eliminated Teams by Era
Dep. Var: Home Win Percentage Dep. Var: Home Point Differential
(1) (3) (4)
Clinched (Home)
Clinched (Away)
Clinched (Home)
Clinched (Away)
-0.019
(0.062)
-0.049
(0.057)
0.149
(0.072)**
-0.105
(0.057)*
Panel A. Before 1984
-0.037
(0.063)
-0.045
(0.057)
12,982
Panel B. After 1988
0.153
(0.071)**
-0.105
(0.058)*
22,304
0.724
(1.705)
-1.844
(1.767)
3.095
(1.887)
-4.898
(1.555)***
0.501
(1.717)
-1.874
(1.787)
3.277
(1.853)*
-4.938
(1.551)***
Games Left Controls Home FEs Home & Away FEs Home FEs Home & Away FEs
Notes: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of a dummy for a home team win (columns 1 and 2) and the home
team score minus the away team score (columns 3 and 4) on treatment dummies for whether the home and away team had
clinched their draft odds and dummies for whether each team had been eliminated from the playoffs. Panel A shows effects for
the period before the even odds lottery began in 1984 and Panel B shows effects for the period after it ended in 1988. The
"Games Left Controls" row notes the controls included for the number of games remaining in the season (fixed effects for just
the home team or for both teams). All regressions include home team by season and away team by season fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the team-season level are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%
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